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A LEGAL PLURALIST APPROACH TO 
THE USE OF CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ADJUDICATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
Valeska Davidt 
Julie Fraser* 
INTRODUCTION 
The assertion that state law is the law is perhaps one of the greatest 
and most embedded creeds in Western legal cultures.' In practice, however, 
individuals coexist among multiple communities generating and enforcing 
norms.2 Some df these norms are regarded as official law, while others are 
considered informal or customary law (or not even law at all).3 While law-
yers tend to focus on state-sanctioned law-the self-proclaimed only law-
legal pluralist scholars have long studied legal hybridity in a given social 
field.4 In this paper, we borrow some of their insights to analyze the opera-
tion of international human rights law. The state monopoly on the produc-
tion and enforcement of law has not only sidelined infra-state normative 
orders, but also denied public international law (including human rights 
law) the quality of law.5 In spite of its state-sanctioned character, human 
rights law retains its oddity among the law of states and unlike the latter, the 
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1. Within scholarship on legal pluralism, there is a long and ongoing debate re-
garding both the definition of law and legal pluralism itself. It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to address this debate. See generally Brian Z Tamanaha, UnderstandingLe-
gal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 (2008). 
2. Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice:Tales of Jurisdictions,14 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 179, 182 (1984). He also notes that "the question of what is law and for whom is a 
question of fact about what certain communities believe and whit what commitments to 
those beliefs." Robert Cover, The Supreme Court. Foreword:Nomos and Narrative,97 
HARV. L. REv. 4, 4-5 (1983). 
3. On official and unofficial law, see, e.g., Masaji Chiba, Three Dichotomies of 
Law in Pluralism:An Analytical Scheme of Legal Culture, TOKAI L. REV. 173 (1987). 
4. See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social 
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & Soc'Y REV. 719, 720 (1972). 
5. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 214-16 (1994). 
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former can hardly deny the normative power of the multiplicity of actors 
intervening in its operations. Moreover, and far from being self-contained, 
the different layers or sub-regimes of a fragmented human rights law are in 
constant overlap and exchange.6 As such, we subscribe to the view of inter-
national human rights law as a multilayered architecture, whereby states, 
supranational organs, non-state as well as transnational and local actors, all 
generate, reconstruct, and contest normative postulates. 
We take a legal pluralist approach with the aim of better grasping the 
challenges and opportunities in the implementation and adjudication of 
human rights norms, focusing on non-dominant groups raising cultural 
claims.7 On a more modest note, legal pluralist lenses may at least provide a 
more realistic account of how international human rights law functions in 
practice. In particular, we follow Berman when he says: "while it does not 
offer substantive norms, a pluralist approach may favor procedural mecha-
nisms, institutions, and practices that provide opportunities for plural 
voices."8 And such opportunities are vitally necessary in human rights, 
given the global cultural diversity existing within the system. Rather than 
being one-size-fits-all, culture often plays a deterministic role in perspec-
tives on human rights. Legal pluralist lenses are therefore helpful in under-
standing the link and interaction between human rights and culture as 
normative orders with overlapping subject matters. Sometimes these orders 
can be viewed as complementary and, at other times, as apathetic or contra-
dictory. It is for actors, including states, judges, and international bodies -
as well as civil society and local communities - to navigate and reconcile 
them. Often these tasks are done in the context of human rights implemen-
tation and adjudication of specific cultural claims. 
6. Carlos Ivdin Fuentes, Ren6 Provost & Samuel G. Walker, E Pluribus Unum -
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika? Universal Human Rights and the Fragmentationof Interna-
tional Law, in DIALOGUES ON Hum. RTS. & LEGAL PLURALISM 37, 66 (Rend Provost & 
Colleen Sheppard eds., 2013); Barbara Oomen, The applicationof socio-legal theories 
of legalpluralismto understandingthe implementation and integrationof human rights 
law, 4 EUROPEAN J. Hum. RTs. 471, 493 (2014). 
7. In this paper, non-dominant groups refers to (not monolithic) social groups that 
have relatively less influence in the prevailing political, economic and cultural structur-
ing of society and who normally do not stand as equal peers in social interaction. This 
term is preferred over 'minorities.' Although the latter entails similar connotations, it 
can be misleading when it comes to characterize certain groups, such as women. 
8. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism,80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1166 
(2007). 
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A wide range of actors - human rights users9 - seek entitlements, rec-
ognition, and resources by or while claiming protection of their cultural 
specificity or identity in a myriad of ways. Both culture and identity tend to 
evoke strong moral and normative commitments. According to Waldron, 
identity claims are put forward as versions of rights. Such claims, like rights 
claims, are usually presented as non-negotiable: "They represent who I am", 
which cannot be sacrificed for the benefit of others.10 Thus, assertions of 
culture can be, at least discursively, as powerful as rights. In this sense, 
Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson have also noted that "culturalist" claims are 
likely to carry more weight in adjudication processes and, therefore, they 
are used strategically to justify a wide range of claims.1 ' Furthermore, since 
the notion of "cultural rights" - and culture more generally - is quite flexi-
ble, its use may be especially apt to bring onto the human rights agenda 
issues that would otherwise not easily fit. Almost all human rights can be 
linked to culture, however there is still no agreed definition or list of cul-
tural rights. 12 Indeed, it is submitted that the field of cultural rights is one of 
the least elaborated by international human rights law, which opens up pos-
sibilities for claims that contest prevailing understandings of the social, po-
litical, cultural, and economic life.13 
From a political perspective, cultural claims also hold an important 
emancipatory potential. Third World scholars have observed that 'culture' 
is being embraced "as a terrain of resistance and struggle." 14 For Rajagopal, 
the turn to culture in the 'Global South' has translated into new conceptions 
of human rights for building alternatives to prevailing models of modernity, 
democracy, development, and market." Yet, at the same time, post-colo-
nialist and other critical approaches to culture and human rights underscore 
9. See Ellen Desmet, Analysing users' trajectoriesin human rights:a conceptual 
exploration and researchagenda, 8 HUM. RTS. & INT'L LEGAL DISCOURSE 121, 125-
126 (2014). 
10. Jeremy Waldron, Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility, in CITIZENSHIP IN 
DIVERSE SOCIETIES 158 (Kymlicka & Norman eds., 2000). 
11. Jane K. Cowan, Marie-B6nd Dembour & Richard A. Wilson, Introduction, in 
CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 9 (Cowan et al. eds., 
2001). 
12. Yvonne M. Donders, Human Rights: Eye for Cultural Diversity, ORATIEREEKS 
(29 June 2012) 16, http://www.oratiereeks.nl/upload/pdf/PDF-6449webora-
tieDonders.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2017). 
13. Rosemary J. Coombe, Legal Claims to Culture in and Against the Market: 
Neoliberalismand the Global Proliferationof Meaningful Difference, I L. CULTURE & 
THE Hum. 35, 52 (2005). 
14. See BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVEL-
OPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 165 (2003). 
15. Id. at 166, 170. 
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the limitations of international human rights law to live up to its 
emancipatory promise. This is largely due to the neoliberal imprint of the 
existing legal frameworks and the individual justice models endowed in 
human rights courts.' 6 This paper explores whether and how legal pluralist 
approaches to international human rights law can facilitate some of the 
emancipatory goals of claimants. 
This paper analyzes the challenges and opportunities in the implemen-
tation and adjudication of human rights norms concerning cultural claims 
raised by non-dominant groups through the lens of legal pluralism. It ad-
dresses both implementation and adjudication in order to thoroughly con-
sider states' interaction with non-state law and the role of supranational 
supervision. The paper is set out in three parts; the first of which explores 
how acknowledging the coexistence and interaction of different normative 
orders may help to more effectively implement international human rights 
standards. This part looks at ways in which women's rights can be imple-
mented by mobilizing cultural norms relating to dispute resolution and in-
heritance/property rights, and the supervisory role of the UN human rights 
treaty bodies. The second part explores the interaction of normative orders 
in relation to the adjudication of rights claims by the Inter-American and 
European Courts of Human Rights. It examines how cultural rights claims 
reflective of non-dominant normative comnuitments have been brought 
before human rights courts and how they have been incorporated or accom-
modated. The paper analyzes not only a range of mechanisms that are apt to 
deal with normative hybridity, but it also revises some of the challenges 
posed by both the implementation and adjudication enterprises in the con-
text of non-state cultural claims. The third part of this paper deals with this 
matter. The analysis draws insights from literature and case law on human 
rights, cultural diversity, and legal pluralism, as well as ethnographic stud-
ies. Without providing an exhaustive analysis, this paper illustrates the op-
portunities and challenges in the implementation and adjudication of 
culturally related rights claims. 
I. Legal Pluralism and Human Rights Implementation 
While responsibility for implementing international human rights law 
formally rests on states' parties to the relevant treaties, in practice, a variety 
of interacting normative orders intervene. These other normative orders can 
16. See, e.g., Karen Engle, On FragileArchitecture: The UN Declarationon the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 
141, 160 (2011); Ben Golder, Beyond Redemption? Problematising the Critique of 
Human Rights in ContemporaryInternationalLegal Thought, 2 LONDON REV. INT'L L. 
77, 111-112 (2014). 
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include customary law, and social, cultural, and religious norms. In such 
pluralistic settings, different actors can and do use different norms to legiti-
mize their claims, actions, and decisions. Numerous scholars have advo-
cated approaches to human rights that take into consideration or endeavor to 
incorporate these other normative systems.1 7 Such scholars argue that by 
using these approaches, international human rights can be made more con-
crete, relevant, and effective in local settings by being tailored to the user's 
perspective. By contrast, the failure to recognize and incorporate other nor-
mative orders can be detrimental to the effectiveness of a state's human 
rights measures and to the enjoyment of rights in practice. As Tamanaha 
noted, "[1]aw characteristically claims to rule whatever it addresses, but the 
fact of legal pluralism challenges this claim."' 8 
These inclusive approaches to human rights are premised on the fact 
that while conceptualized universally on the international level, in domestic 
implementation rights need to be brought down to earth and made meaning-
ful for local communities - vemacularized.1 9 This is in line with interna-
tional law, which accepts that the variety of cultures and contexts in states 
around the world necessitates some distinction in the manner and form of 
human rights implementation. 20 Put simply: the universality of rights does 
not require their uniformity in implementation. 2 1 A diversity or variety of 
rights on the ground tailored to ensure their local enjoyment is "not at odds 
17. See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 3-4 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-
Na'im ed., 1992); Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development 
Respond to CulturalLegitimization of GenderHierarchy in Developing Countries?,41 
HARV. INT'L L. J. 381, 417 (2000); Tom Zwart, Using Local Culture to Furtherthe 
Implementation of InternationalHuman Rights: The Receptor Approach, 34 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 156, 157 (2012). 
18. Tamanaha, supra note 1, at 375. 
19. Peggy Levitt & Sally Engle Merry, Vernacularizationon the Ground: Local 
Uses of Global Women's Rights in Peru, China, Indiaand the UnitedStates, 9 GLOBAL 
NETWORKS 441, 441 (2009); see also Sally Engle Merry, Legal Transplants and Cul-
turalTranslation:Human Rights in the Vernacular, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ANTHROPO-
LOGICAL READER 265, 287 (Mark Goodale ed., 2009). 
20. David Kinley, Bendable Rules: The Development Implications of Human 
Rights Pluralism, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTI-
TIONERS IN DIALOGUE 50, 51-52 (Brian Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock 
eds., 2012). 
21. See Cees Flinterman, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 60, 26 
NETH. Q. Hum. RTS. 481, 482 (2008); Eva Brems, Reconciling Universalityand Diver-
sity in InternationalHuman Rights: A Theoreticaland MethodologicalFramework and 
Its Application in the Context of Islam, 5 Hum. RTs. REV. 5, 13 (2004). 
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with maintaining human rights as a global language." 22 This flexibility is 
provided for in the international human rights system, which accommodates 
diversity in different ways. This section of the paper considers one such 
mechanism for accommodating diversity: the subsidiarity principle and the 
fact that international law does not prescribe national implementation 
measures. 
States parties to human rights treaties are obliged to ensure that indi-
viduals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction benefit from 
the guarantees laid down in those treaties. However, the treaties do not give 
concrete instructions as to how the various rights are to be guaranteed. 2 3 For 
example, Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) provides that "each State Party undertakes to take the nec-
essary steps.. .to give effect to the rights" therein. 2 4 The UN Human Rights 
Committee's has held that this Article "generally leaves it to the States Par-
ties concerned to choose their method of implementation in their territo-
ries."25 As such, under international law, states enjoy discretion with regard 
to the method of domestic implementation of their treaty obligations. 26 Gal-
ligan and Sandler note that as human rights standards are often vague and 
open-ended, each state has discretion to determine what those standards 
mean and what constitutes adequate compliance. 27 This, they claim, is not 
an error to be remedied but rather reflects "the compromise between the 
universalist claims of human rights and the imperatives of local.culture." 28 
Implicitly, states are better placed than the international community to 
select human rights implementation measures based on their effectiveness 
in their domestic setting. On this basis, and given states' discretion, the 
international system accepts that there is not one way to effectively imple-
22. Koen de Feyter, Treaty Interpretationandthe Social Sciences, in METHODS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH 225 (Fons Coomans, Fred GrUnfeld & Menno T. Kamminga 
eds., 2009). 
23. Ineke Boerefijn, International Human Rights in National Law, INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 577, 579 (Catarina Krause & 
Martin Scheinin eds., 2009). 
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 2(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
25. UN Human Rights Committee, GeneralComment No. 3, "Article 2 Implemen-
tation at the National Level" ¶ 1, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 4 (July 19, 1981). 
26. Nisuke Ando, National Implementation and Interpretation, THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 698, 702 (Dinah Shelton ed., 
2013). 
27. Denis Galligan & Deborah Sandler, Implementing Human Rights, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: Socio-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NA-
TIONAL CONTEXT 23, 27-28 (Simon Halliday & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2004). 
28. Id. at 28. 
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ment rights, but potentially many. For example, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 
Article 3 provides that states "shall take in all fields, in particular the politi-
cal, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including 
legislation." 29 This is not just a phenomenon in the UN system but also can 
be seen in regional human rights treaties, which foresee implementation by 
legal as well as other measures. 30 In this way, as long as states meet their 
treaty obligations, they are free to choose the most appropriate way of doing 
so at the domestic level. As such, states have the possibility to employ mul-
tiple normative orders - including but not limited to state law - in the imple-
mentation of international human rights standards. 
To date, however, much attention has been paid to the legal incorpora-
tion of rights into constitutions and national legislation, with the result that 
the role of other measures has not been as thoroughly considered. This also 
evidences the bias referred to earlier of state law as the law. Examination of 
other methods of implementation is crucial given that state law may be 
unsuccessful - and sometimes even counter-productive - in protecting 
rights in practice. For example, implementing women's rights can be diffi-
cult when they are contrary to well-entrenched local norms. In such circum-
stances, state legislative measures tend to be ignored by local law enforcers 
and the public alike, or rejected by particular communities. In both cases, 
women-the intended beneficiaries-are often left particularly vulnerable 
and unable to enjoy their rights. As such, this section explores the possibil-
ity of states using other systems of normative ordering than legislation to 
realize women's rights in practice and within their cultures. This section 
uses two examples relating to dispute resolution and inheritance/property 
rights. It employs a legal pluralist perspective to consider how to implement 
human rights standards in various communities to better accommodate cul-
tural groups and the vulnerable among them. 
A. Non-State Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
An important aspect of legal pluralism is its recognition of multiple 
systems of dispute resolution. While the state will often have dedicated for-
mal institutions, it does not have a monopoly on dispute resolution 
29. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, art. 3, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [herein-
after CEDAW]. 
30. See American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose," Costa Rica, 
art. 2, Nov. 22, 1969, 144 U.N.T.S. 1979; African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights [Banjul Charter] (Nairobi, Kenya, June 27, 1981), 21 I.L.M. 59, art. 1 (1981) 
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). 
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processes. In any given setting around the world, multiple competing op-
tions are likely to exist for resolving disputes between community mem-
bers. These may include religious, social, kinship based, or formal state 
mechanisms. As such, individuals can forum shop and select their dispute 
resolution mechanism. Sometimes state mechanisms may be preferable if 
they can better protect the relevant right or individual in question, other 
times they may not. For example, the state system may be an unattractive 
option if it is seen as corrupt, inefficient, or hostile by community members, 
or if it is inaccessible due to its location, cost, slow process, complexity, 
obscurity and/or lack of cultural sensitivity. 31In contrast, non-state mecha-
nisms may be familiar, readily available, affordable, efficient, and socially 
legitimate.32 
While practical factors such as (in)accessibility may be persuasive, it 
can also be a deliberate choice of claimants to avoid state institutions. For 
example, state dispute resolution mechanisms may not be attractive for 
some communities, such as in Japan, where adversarial approaches and ju-
dicial orders are not always welcomed. As Onuma notes, "one is expected 
to reach the same goal by resorting to less forceful measures such as patient 
negotiations, mediation, and other conciliatory measures."3 3 Similarly in 
Bali, Indonesia, it is expected that "disputes should be settled in harmony, 
on the basis of kinship and togetherness." 34 Many African societies also 
promote reconciliation and more community based solutions to disputes. In 
Vubo's research in Cameroon, members of a voluntary association pro-
posed a variety of solutions to problems identified with their association 
(such as corruption and mismanagement); however, none of them proposed 
submitting to state legal procedures. It was held that resort to such proce-
dures may "compromise the spirit of trust, fraternity, solidarity and sacrifice 
31. Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, Introduction, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND 
DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 1, 1-2 (Brian Tamanaha, 
Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock eds., 2012); Elin Henrysson & Sandra F. Joireman, 
On the Edge of the Law: Women's Property Rights and Dispute Resolution in Kisii, 
Kenya, 43 LAW & Soc'y REV. 39, 49 (2009); see also Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, Are 
Local Norms and PracticesFences or Pathways? The Example of Women's Property 
Rights, CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 126, 137, 140, 
143 (A. A. An-Na'im ed., 2002). 
32. Sage & Woolcock, supra note 31, at 2. 
33. Yasuaki Onuma, In Quest of Intercivilizationof Human Rights: "Universalvs. 
Relative" Human Rights Viewed from an Asian Perspective, Centrefor Asian Pacific 
Affairs, Asia Foundation, Occasional Paper No. 2 (1996) p. 4. 
34. Ingrid Westendorp, Personal Status Law and Women's Right to Equality in 
Law and in Practice:The Case of Land Rights of Balinese Hindu Women, 7 J. Hum. 
RTS. PRAC. 430, 440 (2015). 
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that is at the basis of this type of association."3 5 These long-standing infor-
mal dispute resolution mechanisms have been adapted in contemporary 
times to address widespread human rights problems. For example, the Ga-
cacas of Rwanda were used to address the genocide in 1994, and more 
recently, NariAdalat in India are used to address violence against women. 
As in many parts of the world, discrimination and violence against 
women exists on a large scale in India and persists despite state attempts to 
prevent and punish it via legislation and formal institutions. 36 Discrimina-
tion and violence against women is a violation of women's rights under 
several international human rights treaties. To address this, several initia-
tives were undertaken by the state and other actors, including creating the 
Nari Adalat. These "women's courts" address issues including domestic vi-
olence, rape, polygamy, child custody, divorce, and dowry matters.37 The 
petitioners are largely low caste, uneducated women, and the judges are 
women from the same communities with no formal education or training -
but who act as "peer mediators."38 The Nari Adalat have added another 
mechanism to the pre-existing plural legal system in India, which comprises 
formal state courts, village panchayats,as well as informal family and com-
munity mediation services. 39 These other pre-existing avenues are often ex-
pensive, time consuming, unfamiliar, ineffective, and even sometimes 
35. Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo, On the Viability of AssociationalLife in Traditional 
Society and Home-Based Associations, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SEARCH FOR DEVEL-
OPMENT ALTERNATIVES IN CAMEROON 95, 119 (Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo ed., 2009). 
36. CEDAW Committee, Concludingobservationsof the Committee on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination against Women - India, ¶I 10, 20, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/IND/ 
CO/4-5 (July 24, 2014); Ratna Kapur, Revisioning the Role of Law in Women's Human 
Rights Struggles, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PER-
SPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 101, 101 (Saladin Meckled-
Garcfa & Bayak Cali eds., 2006); Sesha Kethineni, Murugesan Srinivasan & Suman 
Kakar, Combatting Violence against Women in India: Nari Adalats and Gender-Based 
Justice, 26 WOMEN & CRIM. JusT. 281, 282-85, 297 (2016). 
37. Manadendra Sen & Preethi Krishnan, The Nari Adalat: A Grassroots Re-
sponse to Violence and Injustice against Women, in INNOVATIONS TOWARDS EDUCA-
MOVEMENTTION FOR EMPOWERMENT: GRASSROOTS WOMEN'S 62, 62 (Sangeetha 
Purushothaman ed., 2010); Kethineni et al., supra note 36, at 286. 
38. Sylvia Vatuk, The "women's court" in India: An Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Body for Women in Distress, 45 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 76, 77 
(2013). 
39. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralismand Legal Culture: Mapping the Terrain, 
LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 
66, 74 (Brian Tamanaha, et al. eds., 2012). 
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hostile to women's complaints. 4 0 Alternative avenues are necessary as the 
"vast majority" of women suffering from domestic violence or other marital 
disputes do not consider turning to the state for resolution. 4 1 The Nari 
Adalat are therefore a vital addition to the plural Indian system, providing 
women with an affordable, sensitive, and approachable option to resolve 
disputes and have their rights upheld. 4 2 
Crucial to the success of the NariAdalat is that they enjoy local legiti-
macy and broad community support. Because they are embedded in and 
stem from the community, the Nari Adalat have a thorough understanding 
of their clients and context, including local customs and traditions. 4 3 Due to 
this position, the NariAdalat are particularly effective as they are able to 
craft solutions that meet the needs of their petitioners and yet are also seen 
as having legitimacy and community ownership.44 This is important be-
cause the NariAdalat rely on their local community to provide evidence in 
cases, to support the appearance of the accused, and to enforce their deci-
sions after judgment. 4 5 While they utilize some legal formalities (such as 
issuing decisions on legal paper), the Nari Adalat have no state legal au-
thority and rely exclusively on public pressure and naming and shaming. 46 
Without strong community support, they could not function. 
In addition to community support, the Nari Adalat also receive state 
support. While outside formal state institutions, the Nari Adalat borrow 
state legitimacy and receive state support, such as funding and police assis-
tance.47 In this way, the Nari Adalat are an example of how the state can 
intervene to assist with the national implementation of human rights 
through normative orders other than state laws and institutions. This could 
be an example of what Zwart terms state "amplification" of grass-roots sys-
tems that work to protect and promote human rights.48 In this case, the Nari 
Adalat are modeled on the well-known informal panchayats system, but 
adapted to be run by women for women with state support but not direction. 
As Merry has noted, based on the inherent dynamism of culture, established 
40. Id. at 78-9; Sen & Krishnan, supra note 37, at 52, 64; Kethineni et al., supra 
note 36, at 296. 
41. Vatuk, supra note 38, at 81-83. 
42. Sen & Krishnan, supra note 37, at 65. 
43. Id. at 57-58; Vatuk, supra note 38, at 77. 
44. Sen & Krishnan, supra note 37, at 58. 
45. Id. at 58, 60, 63. 
46. Merry, supra note 39, at 77; Sen & Krishnan, supra note 37, at 58. 
47. For example, the Gujerati state provides "a sitting fee" for Nari Adalat mem-
bers and the police has assisted with collecting information and pressuring perpetrators 
to comply. See Merry, supra note 39, at 75; Sen & Krishnan, supranote 37, at 57, 70. 
48. Zwart, supra note 17, at 558-64. 
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cultural forms (like the panchayats) can be deployed in new situations and 
take on new meanings. 49 Here, the Nari Adalat were able to provide for 
vulnerable women in a way that the formal state law mechanisms had not 
been able. 
These 'women's courts' are necessary in India given the failure of the 
state mechanisms to effectively address women's rights and combat domes-
tic violence. However, questions remain regarding whether the Nari Adalat 
are effective enough: Do they provide women with real, sustainable solu-
tions - or simply ameliorate the immediate harm? While acknowledging a 
degree of success, Vatuk criticizes the NariAdalatfor not sufficiently chal-
lenging patriarchal norms on marriage and women's role in society. How-
ever, the Nari Adalat's effectiveness is based on the fact that they are 
accepted as legitimate within the communities where they operate. They 
would likely lose this legitimacy if they radically rejected local cultural 
norms in favor of promoting an incompatible version of women's rights. By 
taking their current approach-a middle route-the NariAdalat can be seen 
as local, credible change agents, and vital sites of intra-cultural engagement 
and dialogue on sensitive issues of women' rights. As often reiterated, 
change initiated from within a cultural community is more likely to be last-
ing and effective than change coerced by external actors-including the 
state. While perhaps not an immediate solution,5 0 the Nari Adalat are an 
important means of effectively implementing women's rights within their 
cultural context. Like all dispute resolution mechanisms, there are limits on 
the ability of the Nari Adalat to transform society. However, they have 
succeeded in providing protection for women's rights where state mecha-
nisms had failed. 
B. Non-State Regulation of Land and Inheritance 
Another well-known manifestation of legal pluralism relates to the va-
rious systems in which to recognize and regulate access to and interest in 
land and inheritance. Particularly in post-colonial settings, multiple norma-
tive systems co-exist and overlap for regulating land and inheritance, in-
cluding customary and state law. Navigating between these systems is 
important to protect one's right to land (in order to cultivate food and as a 
49. Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture (And 
Anthropology Along the Way), 26 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REv. 55, 69 (2003). 
50. Sezgin notes the efficacy of such "gradual" measures of "revolution" or "re-
form" from within that are ultimately "more likely to be readily adopted" - as opposed 
to top down measures by the state. Yiksel Sezgin, How to Integrate UniversalHuman 
Rights into Customary and ReligiousLegal Systems, 60 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFI-
CIAL L. 5, 29-30 (2010). 
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source of wealth), yet can also be difficult given the inconsistencies and 
conflicts between the systems. For example, while a state may have legis-
lated equality in their national legislation providing for women to inherit 
and hold land, this may be inconsistent with other local systems regulating 
land or family relations that limit or prevent women from owning or inherit-
ing land.51 While in plural systems individuals can forum shop to a certain 
extent regarding how to secure their interest in land and property, depend-
ing on one's location, status, and cultural belonging, there may not be much 
of a choice. 52 This is particularly the case for women who may be reluctant 
or unable to petition the state to protect their rights,53 or if they do, it may 
be perceived by their community as an attempt to disrupt communal values, 
"gender relations, and society more generally." 54 Around the world, unequal 
access to land between women and men is one of the foremost causes of 
economic inequality, diminishing women as social and political actors.55 
According to human rights treaties (such as CEDAW), states parties 
are obliged to guarantee women equal rights, specifically regarding prop-
erty ownership. 56 This is relevant as numerous customary systems provide 
for patrilineal inheritance and for men to be the sole property owners. For 
example, Indonesia has a plural legal system, including formal state law and 
multiple customary systems based on religion and tradition. Indonesia is a 
party to CEDAW and has implemented principles of non-discrimination and 
equality in its Constitution. It also has human rights legislation, which per-
mits women to own land, hold marital property, and receive half upon di-
vorce.5 7 Despite these state initiatives, some Indonesian women do not 
51. Rwandan society is a case in point. See, e.g., Katrijn Vanhees, PhD Research 
Fellow, Conference Paper Presented at the 2016 World Bank Conference on Land and 
Poverty, Improving Land Rights for Women: Blind Trust in the Magic of Formal Mar-
riage 12 (Mar. 14-18, 2016). 
52. From their study of the Kisii in Kenya, Henrysson and Joireman claim that 
women's only option was to use customary rather than formal dispute resolution for 
land claims due to the cost. Even then, the cost may be too high for many vulnerable 
women. Elin Henrysson & Sandra F. Joireman, On the Edge of the Law: Women's 
PropertyRights and DisputeResolution in Kisii, Kenya, 43 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 39, 53-
54 (2009). 
53. Customary systems may be a better venue given women's negative exper-
iences with formal systems. Id. at 41. 
54. Aili Mari Tripp, Women's Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in 
Africa: The Case of Uganda, 7 AFRICAN STUD. Q. 1, 2, 12 (2004). 
55. Id. at 6. 
56. CEDAW, supra note 29, art. 2, 16(1)(h). 
57. See, e.g., THE 1945 CONsTITUTIoN OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, art. 
28(I)(2); Marriage Act (Act No. 1/ 1974) (Indon.); see Basic Agrarian Law (No. 5/ 
1960/ art. 9(2)) (Indon.); Westendorp, supra note 34, at 437-38; Ratno Lukito, The 
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enjoy these rights in practice, due among other things to decentralization 
and the predominance of customary law. 8 This reflects the fact that not-
withstanding the official place of state law, in practice, it can fail to com-
pete with other normative orders. 59 Other such examples exist, and scholars 
have noted that ensuring women's right and access to land has long been a 
problematic aspect of customary systems. 60 Rather than seeking to abolish 
conflicting customary systems, or prescribing their rules from the national 
level, states and other actors can work with customary systems to imple-
ment women's rights within their cultural context. 
For instance, the codified customary law in Bali for the Hindu commu-
nity (Adat law) provided for inheritance on a patrilineal basis. 61 However, 
many within the Balinese community disagreed with these laws, were con-
cerned for their daughters, sisters and wives' well-being, and sought to pro-
vide for their inheritance. 62 Westendorp details Balinese parents who made 
arrangements for their daughters to inherit or who gifted property to their 
daughters before they passed away. 63 This is an example of what Nyamu 
has described, claiming that while norms are typically articulated in rigid 
ways, they "will often fail to capture all of social reality."64 Nyamu argues 
that notwithstanding stated cultural norms - especially ones like codified 
customary law - "[1]ocal practices are varied, and people's day-to-day in-
teractions are more revealing of the 'living' cultural norms." 65 To illustrate, 
Nyamu also uses the example of women's inheritance, however in Kenya. 
While Kenyan state law permits daughters to inherit, customary practice 
continues to exclude women, who typically have a right to farm land but 
cannot own, inherit, or control its dispossession. 66 As in Bali, despite the 
Enigma of NationalLaw in Indonesia: The Supreme Court'sDecision on Gender-Neu-
tral Inheritance, 35 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 147, 153 (2006). 
58. CEDAW Committee, Concluding observationsof the Committee on the Elimi-
nation of Discriminationagainst Women - Indonesia, CEDAW/C/IDN/CO/6-7, [ 15 
(July 27, 2012); and, Westendorp, supra note 34, at 439. 
59. Tamanaha notes that sometimes state law is simply "impotent." Tamanaha, 
supra note 1, at 385-386. 
60. Henrysson & Joireman, supra note 31, at 41-42; see also Tripp, supra note 54, 
at 3-4, 11. 
61. Lukito, supra note 57, at 149; Westendorp, supra note 34, at 439. 
62. Westendorp, supra note 34, at 443. 
63. Id. Lukito details a similar example in the matrilineal system in Minangkabau, 
where fathers would gift their estates before dying. Lukio, supra note 57, at 149. 
64. Nyamu-Musembi, supranote 31, at 132-33; see also Tamanaha, supra note 1, 
at 410. 
65. Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 132. 
66. Henrysson & Joireman, supra note 31, at 43, 45. For a discussion of similar 
customary inheritance law in Uganda; see also Tripp, supra note 54, at 6. 
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prevailing customary law in the Akamba community that daughters cannot 
inherit, in practice there is both support for and examples of women's inher-
itance. 6 7 Nyamu argues that these varied practices offer a starting point to 
internally challenge custom and advocate interpretations in line with human 
rights principles.68 
Nyamu advocates utilizing this inherent dynamism in culture to ad-
dress problematic customary practices by seeking out community-based al-
ternatives. By working within customary arrangements, women have found 
different ways to claim land through a variety of mechanisms, including 
inheritance, gift, purchase, loan, lease, and through their husbands and rela-
tives. 69 For example, there is a customary practice among the Kisii for wo-
men to gain heirs and legitimize their presence on the land known as 
"daughter-in-law marriage." Under an invention of customary law, a Kisii 
woman may 'marry' her fictional son to another woman with children by 
paying the bride price, and then that woman becomes her daughter-in-law 
and the children become her grandchildren. 70 Through these children she 
can gain access to land. This is an example of culture's dynamism and how 
creatively custom can be applied, and how culturally aligned variations 
more compliant with human rights can be developed. In this way, women's 
rights can be protected by and within cultural systems, and without state 
intervention. 
As a further example of dynamism, Adat law has been reformed. It 
now provides for women to have half the marital property, which includes a 
new form of marriage (pada gelahang), and that daughters can inherit -
albeit only half that received by sons.7 1 While such unequal inheritance is 
clearly not in conformity with CEDAW, it nevertheless represents welcome 
progress in Adat law.7 2 While this change may not fully protect Balinese 
women's rights, it is a positive opening that can be used to promote com-
munity dialogue and push for further reform. Nyamu encourages those 
seeking human rights compliance to appropriate such positive openings,73 
arguing that the potential to realize "gender equality through local norms 
67. Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 133-34. 
68. See id. 
69. Tripp, supra note 54, at 14. 
70. Henrysson & Joireman, supra note 31, at 44-45 n.6; N. Thomas Hakansson, 
The Detachability of Women: Gender and Kinship in Processes of Socioeconomic 
Change among the Gusii of Kenya, 21 AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST 516, 530 (1994). 
71. Westendorp, supra note 34, at 444 (citing Decree No 01/Kep/Psm-3/MDP 
BalilX/2010, MUJDP Bali, Denpasar, 15 October 2010). 
72. Id. 
73. Celestine Nyamu, supra note 17, at 382. 
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and processes lies in the fact that local custom is in constant motion." 74 The 
creation of a novel form of marriage in Adat law - pada gelahang - also 
illustrates how dynamic customary law can be in responding to community 
needs. Such community-based alternatives are important as they enjoy local 
legitimacy and could be further employed or expanded on the basis of cul-
ture's dynamism to become new norms better protecting women's rights 
within context. 
Westendorp stresses the importance of local legitimacy, holding that 
"cultural change is only possible if the population is convinced of the need 
for it and is committed to it."'7 Many scholars have reiterated this position, 
connecting the legitimacy of norms with their efficacy in practice. For ex-
ample, one of the reasons why the laws changed in Bali was because an 
academic and authority on Adat law engaged with the local leaders and 
persuaded them of the acceptability of different forms of marriage and that 
greater gender equality would not lead to a breakdown of Hindu identity.76 
Westendorp suggests that the local academic was able to do what the state 
could not. Also, not to be discounted, is the agency of those individuals 
within the relevant communities. Recalling culture's inherent dynamism, 
Nyamu notes that people are agents of cultural transformation and can shift 
norms. She argues that change is more likely if a sufficient number of (rela-
tively) powerful people in the community oppose a particular practice.77 To 
create such a consensus for change, Nyamu recommends identifying and 
organizing allies.7 8 As state officials are not best placed to influence local 
norms, Westendorp submits that the state should instead rely upon - and 
financially support - NGOs and individuals working to promote women's 
rights.79 
Whenever advocating change, considerations of power are always im-
portant. Both Nyamu and Westendorp noted that women had less power to 
74. Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 127. 
75. Sezgin, supra note 50, at 29 (2010) pp. 29-30; Westendorp, supra note 34, at 
445. 
76. Westendorp, supra note 34, at 445-46. 
77. Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 135. 
78. Id. An-Na'im emphasizes the necessity for advocates of alternative cultural 
positions on human rights to seek broad acceptance of their position by demonstrating 
"the authenticity and legitimacy of that interpretation within the framework of their own 
culture." An-Na'im, supra note 17, at 4; see also Sezgin, supra note 50, at 23 (regard-
ing building coalitions). 
79. "It is important that they [NGOs] receive financial support from the Indone-
sian authorities, as accepting money from international sources would disqualify them 
in the eyes of the locals." Westendorp (2015) at 446. See also Sezgin, supra note 50, at 
30 - 31. 
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influence change than men, as they are typically not well represented in 
local decision-making bodies.80 This is of course not a problem limited to 
customary systems, but is well-known across communities and state institu-
tions. In such contexts it can be difficult to shift the balance in favor of 
cultural attitudes benefiting women's rights. As such, it is important to pro-
mote inclusivity and the participation of women and other relatively vulner-
able groups in all fora discussing and determining both state and local 
norms.8 ' This may appear to be a somewhat aspirational recommendation 
given that transformation in culture and attitudes is required to ensure such 
inclusive participation. To facilitate the acceptability of women's participa-
tion (and even leadership), Nyamu recommends drawing parallels to other 
institutions in which women play leading roles, such as in churches and 
self-help groups.8 2 In any case, securing inclusive participation at the vari-
ous levels of norm creation, interpretation, and application requires dedi-
cated advocacy, consensus building, and time. 
C. UN Treaty Body System, Human Rights Implementation and Legal 
Pluralism 
As illustrated in this first section, traditional dispute resolution mecha-
nisms and customary law are two examples of non-state ordering systems 
that can be mobilized to help implement human rights. While some states 
(such as India) are indeed already engaging with such normative systems, 
the international human rights treaty system continues to be largely focused 
on states parties and state law. This is reflected in the UN treaty bodies' 
recommendations to states as part of their supervisory role. Some treaty 
bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee (HRCee) and the Committee 
Against Torture, focus predominately on state law and enforcement, 
whereas other bodies can be seen to take a more holistic approach. For 
example, the CEDAW Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC Committee) - while still advocating state law - have also rec-
ommended that states parties undertake a variety of other measures to effec-
tively implement human rights standards. Such measures have included 
education (including non-formal education); microcredit programs; creating 
public dialogue and debate; and the use of theatre, TV programs, art, and 
80. Id. at 443; Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31 at 141. See also CEDAW Commit-
tee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
againstWomen - Kenya, 5 April 2011, CEDAW/C/KEN/CO/7, ¶ 41. 
81. Nyamu, supra note 17, at 403; Sezgin, supra note 50, at 32. 
82. Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 142-43. 
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music.8 3 Importantly, they have also recommended states cooperate with 
civil society organizations and engage local community and religious 
groups and leaders.8 4 
However, despite all the UN treaty bodies envisaging implementation 
measures other than those based solely on state law to varying degrees, they 
still generally address the state as the primary actor. This is an obvious 
result of the fact that international law is binding upon the state as the party 
to the treaty. However, such a state-centric approach has certain limitations 
regarding effective human rights implementation. As reiterated in this sec-
tion, the state is not necessarily best placed to change a community's norms 
that challenge international human rights standards. To be effective, mea-
sures implementing human rights need to be initiated by or with the rele-
vant cultural community and to enjoy local legitimacy. On this basis, the 
focus of the UN treaty system on the state for human rights implementation 
may appear somewhat misplaced. The state measures recommended by the 
treaty bodies are top down rather than bottom up, which primafacie sug-
gests that they are unlikely to be embraced by cultural communities when 
85 contrary to local norms. As such, UN treaty bodies could do more to en-
courage states parties to engage with local actors and norms in legally plu-
ral settings, and more could be done by states to collaborate with and 
support such actors. While the UN General Assembly, CRC Committee, 
and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have acknowl-
edged that all members of society have responsibilities regarding the reali-
zation of human rights,8 6 more could be done to flesh out these 
83. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint General Recommendation No 31 of the 
Committee on the Eliminationof DiscriminationAgainst Women/General Comment No 
18 on the Committee on the Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, ¶1 63 -81, 
CEDAW/C/GC31-CRC/C/GC/18 (Nov. 14, 2014). 
84. See e.g., Committee on the Rights of the Child, GeneralComment No 5, 11 56 
- 59, CRC/GC/2003/5 (Nov. 27, 2003); CEDAW Committee, supra note 80, ¶¶ 18(a), 
20(c); CEDAW Committee, supra note 58, ¶118(c), 22(b)-(c); CEDAW Committee, 
supra note 36, 1 21(c). 
85. Sezgin notes that government interference can invoke "fierce resistance." 
Sezgin, supra note 50, at 11-12. 
86. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 5, 1 56, CRC/ 
GC/2003/5 (Nov. 23, 2003); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Gen-
eral Comment No 14 The right to the highest attainablestandard of health (art. 12 
ICESCR), 142, E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000); G.A. Res. 53/144, Declarationon the 
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organsof Society to Promote and 
ProtectUniversally Recognized Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, A/RES/53/ 
144 (March 8, 1999); G.A. Res. 217 A(III), preamble, (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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responsibilities and the relationship between the state and other actors in 
society. 
For example, the treaty bodies sometimes pass up opportunities to mo-
bilize plural legal systems in the protection of human rights. As an illustra-
tion, in response to Kenya's most recent report, the CEDAW Committee 
noted their concern "that, while women's access to justice is provided for 
by legislation, their ability to exercise that right and bring cases of discrimi-
nation before courts is limited by such factors as legal costs, the persistence 
of traditional justice systems, illiteracy, lack of information about their 
rights, and other practical difficulties in accessing courts."8 7 As such, they 
advised Kenya to educate the public and those working in the justice sector 
about CEDAW, to adopt national legal aid, and implement legal literacy 
programs.8 8 The CEDAW Committee did not refer further to the role played 
by traditional justice systems, thereby failing to engage Kenya on potential 
measures to mitigate their negative effects or capitalize on the advantages, 
simply requesting them "to take all appropriate measures to remove impedi-
ments women may face in gaining access to justice." 89 
In response to domestic violence in India, the CEDAW Committee re-
cently recommended, inter alia, legislation (including in relation to victim 
reparation) to criminalize marital rape and to provide harsher sentences for 
perpetrators of acid attacks.90 Similarly, regarding early and forced mar-
riages, the Committee recommended India pass and implement legislation 
and to "effectively investigate, prosecute and punish cases of forced and 
early marriage." 91 They only recommended state law solutions, but they did 
not refer to other normative systems as a means to protect women's rights -
such as the Nai-i Adalat. This is despite the fact that the Committee noted 
"the coexistence of multiple legal systems with regard to marriage and fam-
ily relations in the State party, applying to the various religious groups." 92 
The Committee called upon India to ensure equality between men and wo-
men in marriage by "[e]nsuring that all the laws on marriage and family 
relations governing the various religious groups. . . are in full compliance 
with" CEDAW.9 3 Here, taking only a top down approach, the Committee 
missed the opportunity to recommend India engage with and mobilize these 
87. CEDAW Committee, supra note 80, ¶ 13. 
88. Id. at ¶ 14. 
89. Id. at ¶ 14(c). 
90. They also recommended training for police, crisis shelters and medical assis-
tance for victims. CEDAW Committee, supra note 36, 1 11. 
91. Id. at[ 39. 
92. Id. at ¶ 40. 
93. Id. at ¶ 41(a). 
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other systems as a means to promote women's rights within their cultural 
context. 
The CEDAW Committee has also frequently commented on discrimi-
nation regarding women's ownership and inheritance of land. They have 
noted their concern that customs and traditional practices in Kenya, Indone-
sia, and India prevented women from owning or inheriting land and other 
property. 94 As such, they recommended Kenya establish a legislative frame-
work to increase and strengthen women's participation in designing and 
implementing local development plans and "[i]ntroduce measures to ad-
dress negative customs and traditional practices, especially in rural areas, 
which affect full enjoyment of the right to property by women." 95 They 
urged Indonesia to eliminate this discrimination, to bring all provisions in 
line with CEDAW, and to "guarantee equal inheritance rights to women. "96 
India was advised to "[a]bolish traditional practices and customs that pre-
vent rural women from inheriting and acquiring land and from fully en-
joying their rights and guarantee land ownership rights to women."9 7 Here 
again, the Committee identifies competing normative orders as challenging 
human rights implementation, but treats the norms as an obstacle to be 
overcome (or abolished), rather than an alternative system for states to en-
gage in human rights protection. 
However, the CEDAW Committee has, as noted above, also en-
couraged states parties to promote public dialogue and engage with commu-
nities and civil society. For example, the Committee urged India to: 
initiate and encourage debate within the relevant communities . . . 
and ... work with and support women's groups as members of these 
communities so as to (a) modify social and cultural patterns of con-
duct to achieve elimination of prejudices and practices based on ster-
eotyped roles for men and women and (b) review and reform 
personal laws of different ethnic and religious groups to ensure de 
jure gender equality and compliance with the Convention." 
Similarly, Indonesia was urged to: 
[r]aise awareness of religious groups and leaders about the impor-
tance of amending legal provisions; increase support for law reform 
through partnerships and collaboration with Islamic jurisprudence re-
search organizations, civil society organizations, women's non-gov-
94. Id. at ¶ 32; CEDAW Committee, supra note 58, [[ 45(a), 47(d); CEDAW 
Committee, supra note 80, 1 41. 
95. CEDAW Committee, supra note 80, ¶ 42(a)-(c). 
96. CEDAW Committee, supra note 58, ¶¶ 46(a), 48(b). 
97. CEDAW Committee, supra note 36, ¶ 33(a). 
98. Id. at I 11. 
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emmental organizations and community leaders supportive of the 
advancement of women's rights99 
These are very positive recommendations and demonstrate the 
CEDAW Committee's understanding of culture's role in human rights and 
the interplay of plural legal systems in implementation. 00 
However, these recommendations still tend to be made only in second 
place, with the primary focus on state legislation and enforcement. For ex-
ample, as a result of two fatwas by the Council of Ulemas, Indonesia with-
drew its ban on FGM/C and permitted circumcision by a medical 
practitioner. In response, the CEDAW Committee encouraged Indonesia to 
adopt robust legislation criminalizing FGM/C and providing sanctions for 
offenders.' 0 The Committee then added that Indonesia should also raise 
awareness among religious groups and leaders, and encourage comparative 
studies with other groups that do not practice FGM/C.1 02 While this is an 
important addition and indicates an awareness of engaging in this manner, it 
comes only after the initial focus on state law and criminal sanctions. As 
this example shows, Islamic law as determined by the Council of Ulemas 
clearly has significant influence in Indonesia and its opposition to a state 
law can override those provisions. As such, it is essential (not secondary) to 
mobilize that plural legal system in order to arrive at a legitimate and sus-
tainable position against FGMIC in Indonesia. 
The analysis in this section indicates that all actors in society can and, 
at times, do play an important role in human rights implementation. This is 
especially so when overlapping normative orders exist, impacting particular 
human rights. While more progressive than some of the other UN treaty 
bodies, the CEDAW Committee could be more consistent in engaging with 
other normative orders. In this way, and via state mediation, international 
law and non-state law can be in conversation, mutually influencing and 
shaping one another.1 03 Given international law's focus on the state, it does 
99. CEDAW Committee, supra note 58, at ¶ 18(c). 
100. Quane argues that the treaty bodies "envisage an inclusive and participatory 
law reform process" that "effectively attempts to co-opt these traditional and religious 
leaders." See, e.g., Helen Quane, Legal Pluralism and InternationalHuman Rights 
Law: Inherently Incompatible, Mutually Reinforcing or Something in Between? 33 Ox-
FORD J. LEGAL STUD. 699, 699-700 (2013). 
101. CEDAW Committee, supra note 58, ¶[ 21, 22(a). 
102. Id. at [l 22(b)-(c). 
103. Quane notes that we are in "the very early stages in this relationship." Helen 
Quane, InternationalHuman Rights Law as a Catalystfor the Recognition and Evolu-
tion of Non-State Law, in NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW: THE CHALLENGE 
OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL LEGAL PLURALISM 11, 113, 128, 132 (Michael A. Helfand ed., 
2016). 
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not deal well with non-state actors or law or their incorporation/co-optation 
into the human rights paradigm. Rather than states being the actors and the 
rest of society being passive, community members (and not just leaders) 
have agency and the ability to contribute, shape, and change local cultural 
norms. As an alternative (or in addition) to state legislative intervention in 
other normative orders, states should support local actors advocating human 
rights solutions within their cultural setting. Such support can include the 
state provision of information, education, facilities, and resources including 
funding. While such processes may take time, they can contribute to effec-
tive human rights implementation by creating the conditions for sustainable 
and meaningful change in the relevant normative order. 104 Using other sys-
tems than state law to protect human rights may not deliver instant results, 
but that is also frequently the case even when a law is passed.105 In this way, 
as Nyamu argued, it is possible to realize rights through local practice and 
custom rather than relying on the national formal legal system. 106 
Similarly, at the adjudication stage, supranational bodies can protect 
the rights of cultural communities by recognizing and accommodating non-
state norms. Rather than focusing only on state laws or on state-endorsed 
culture to understand the rights of certain individuals and communities, su-
pranational bodies have increasingly been called upon to recognize other 
norms in determining cultural claims before them. This is done in a more 
explicit manner than in implementation, as members of such cultural com-
munities are parties to the adjudication and place their complaints directly 
before the supranational bodies. In this way, they are able to "translate" 
their claims across normative systems, in a similar way to which interna-
tional norms are translated into local system via implementation. The con-
sideration of other norms than state law has been essential in protecting the 
rights of various non-dominant groups in adjudication by the Inter-Ameri-
104. Quane iterates the central role of the state under international law in this 
process, and the utility of such processes despite the lack of 'quick fix' solutions. 
Quane, supra note 100, at 702. 
105. Brems argues that "it makes no sense to change the laws if these changes are 
not supported by a change in the minds of the people. Therefore, human rights obliga-
tions that require profound societal changes should be realized progressively within a 
reasonable timeframe." Brems, supra note 21, at 18. 
106. Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 126. Also on the importance of articulat-
ing state and non-state forums as a way to advance human rights, see Giselle Corradi, 
Can Legal PluralismAdvance Human Rights? How Development Actors Can Contrib-
ute 26 EUR J DEV RES 783 (2014) (discussing how international aid actors can engage 
with legal pluralism and promote human rights within community structures of dispute 
processing). 
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can and European Courts of Human Rights. This is considered in more de-
tail in the section below. 
II. LEGAL PLURALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION: 
POLYPHONY IN THE COURT ROOM BEYOND STATE-SANCTIONED 
NORMS AND TRADITIONS 
Starting from the premise, discussed above, that insights from legal 
pluralism are helpful in analyzing the operation of a multi-layered regime of 
international human rights law, this second section focuses on supranational 
adjudication. Litigation offers a socio-cultural forum for mobilizing differ-
ent politics, values, and normative orders. As a decision-making process, 
litigation is a space of dialogue and power struggles. 07 Through adjudica-
tion, several normative postulates compete and contest one another. While 
some of them are disregarded, others are appropriated or accommodated by 
the adjudicator. In this regard, the Inter-American and the European Courts 
of Human Rights (IACtHR and ECtHR, respectively) are no exception. 
Moreover, because these courts occupy an intermediate position between 
the local and the global, between states and non-state actors, they are well 
placed to deal with legal pluralities. In this section, the paper draws atten-
tion to issues of normative and cultural recognition from the perspective of 
non-dominant actors in litigation. As such, it departs from a focus on the 
normative space granted by human rights courts to states and situates non-
dominant cultural claims within a legal pluralist perspective. This section 
discusses the accommodation of those claims by the Inter-American and the 
European Courts of Human Rights and the main challenges confronted by 
them in doing so. Particular attention is given to the strategic use and navi-
gation of legal claims, the mechanisms used by human rights courts to ac-
commodate non-dominant normative and cultural claims, and the risks and 
opportunities arising from the way such courts recognize and accommodate 
cultural diversity. 
Means of incorporation and recognition of legal pluralities are usually 
studied in the framework of the interactions between state and non-state 
normative orders, such as when customary or religious laws become part of 
state laws by way of legislation or judicial practice. However, it has been 
increasingly acknowledged that international human rights courts also have 
107. This argument has been mostly advanced in the constitutional context. See 
CHRISTOPHER F. ZURN, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEw 242 (2007); Sandra Liebenberg, Engaging the paradoxes of the universaland 
particularin human rights adjudication: The possibilitiesand pitfalls of 'meaningful 
engagement, 12 AFRICAN Hum. RTS. L.J. 1, 10-11 (2012) (relying on theories of delib-
erative democracy). 
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to deal with issues of incorporation of normative communities. This is espe-
cially so when those organs are called upon to make human rights standards 
reflective of cultural diversity. 08 In the last decades, scholars paid increas-
ing attention to how constitutional and supranational bodies deal with legal 
plurality. 109 In this framework, the literature usually elaborates on devices 
such as subsidiarity (discussed above), federalism, and the margin of appre-
ciation. 0 Kinley adds to this list of devises the limitation clauses in inter-
national treaties, which permit differences pertaining to morality, security, 
etc., and the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies, which gives pri-
ority to the domestic handling of a complaint before it can be heard at the 
international level.11' 
In order to understand how such legal techniques play out in incorpo-
rating or recognizing cultural or normative hybridity, it is useful to consider 
the margin of appreciation. The European Court's margin of appreciation is 
a well-known example of 'deference'1 1 2 because the regional order-repre-
sented by the European Convention on Human Rights and its monitoring 
body, the ECtHR-cedes space to 'another' legal system - in this case, that 
of member states- through the upholding of its normative outputs. It is said 
that in this way the ECtHR allows local normative and cultural variation. 13 
A similar logic -giving space to domestic norms and cultures- underpins the 
other legal devices listed above. 
It should be observed, however, that the aforementioned tools are pri-
marily concerned with making room for or reconciling the normative varia-
tion among constituencies that are institutionally relevant in the current 
constitutional and international order. That is, communities represented by, 
inter alia, nation-states (and their agents), inter-state bodies and transna-
tional polities (such as the EU). Thus, when it is said that such devices 
allow local normative variation, it is important to understand how this at-
tests to an interesting normative interaction that Santos calls dislocation.As 
108. Fuentes et al., supra note 6, at 60; Int'l Council on Human Rights Policy, 
When legal Worlds Overlap: Human Rights, State and Non-State Law 89 (2009); see 
also Roderick A. Macdonald, Pluralistic Human Rights? Universal Human Wrongs?, in 
DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM 15 (Ren6 Provost & Colleen 
Sheppard eds., 2013); Oomen, supra note 6, at 432. 
109. See Michael Rosenfeld, Rethinking ConstitutionalOrderingin an Era of Le-
gal and Ideological Pluralism,6 INT'L J. CONST. L, 415, 418 (2008). 
110. Id. at 445. 
111. Kinley, supra note 20, at 52; see also Berman, supra note 8, at 1209-10. 
112. "The State may grant social groups or communities a private legal space, a 
process sometimes referred to as 'deference.'" Int'l Council on Human Rights Policy, 
supra note 108, at 91. 
113. Berman, supra note 8, at 1201; Brems, supra note 21, at 14. 
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he explains, with the emergence of supranational laws such as human rights 
systems, the position of states has dislocated and acquired a local or infra-
state character. It is in that position that nation-states call upon suprana-
tional orders to recognize their local normative community.11 4 Yet, we 
should not lose sight that from the perspective of many groups and individ-
uals, the state and its laws continue to exercise or consent to their oppres-
sion. Further, they may have reason to question how the state defines its 
local culture. As a result, such people also turn to supranational orders to 
assert their religious, traditional, and other cultural views on human rights, 
and they expect those orders to reduce or deny their normative deference 
towards the state and rather to incorporate people's cultural claims. Supra-
national human rights bodies may therefore face demands of normative/ 
cultural accommodation pulling in opposite directions. Against this back-
drop, this section examines how regional human rights courts in Europe and 
the Americas accommodate normative and cultural plurality advanced by 
those who are usually under-represented within state institutions. 
People belonging to ethnic, cultural and religious communities have 
brought a number of cases before the ECtHR and the IACtHR. Many of 
them assert cultural recognition while contesting socio-economic arrange-
ments. We can think of a number of illustrative cases, such as indigenous 
land-related claims based on customary norms and practices; complaints 
brought by Roma and Traveler people to accommodate their lifestyle of 
living in caravans, whether they are nomadic or not; and cases where wo-
men assert recognition of non-official customary and religious marriages to 
access pensions granted to widows. These cases, which are discussed in the 
sections below, are especially interesting from a legal pluralist perspective. 
In the first place, these cases raise important issues of accommodation and 
recognition of the commitments governing the lives of applicants with eth-
nic, religious, and cultural affiliations." 5 Drawing on Tamanaha's categori-
zation, such commitments reflect customary normative orders as well as 
community/cultural normative systems." 6 In the words of Malik, they are 
114. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: 
LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 94 (2d ed. 2002). 
115. For instance, many have questioned their subjection to "general laws and 
policies [which] failed to accommodate their particular needs arising from their tradi-
tion of living and travelling in caravans." See Beard v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
24882/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 130 (2001); Chapman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27238/ 
95, Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 127 (2001); Coster v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24876/94, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 139 (2001); Lee v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25289/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 127 
(2001). 
116. Tamanaha, supra note 1, at 397-99. 
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"minority legal orders."'"7 Many of these cases relate to claims for recogni-
tion of non-conventional lifestyles, accommodation of non-dominant cul-
tural traditions and practices, as well as incorporation of different 
worldviews and norms in state laws. Moreover, some cultural claims have 
important material and institutional implications that transcend issues of 
symbolic and spiritual preservation of cultural communities or legal 
clashes. As will be seen, at the heart of some complaints are entrenched 
dynamics of prejudices and discrimination, coupled with tensions between 
multi-level government authorities, non-state actors, and trends of 
privatization." 8 
Thus, these cases confront the two major regional human rights courts 
with a complex legal landscape marked by legal overlaps and competing 
normative authorities. They disclose the difficult interaction between, for 
example, central government legislation and ordinances, local development 
plans and regulations, local authorities, and private actors' practices and 
interpretations concerning land, social security, family, housing, planning, 
property, and environmental protection, as well as communal cultural com-
mitments and customary laws, among others. Rather than applying the law 
- the ECHR and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) - in 
a hierarchical fashion to the domestic legal order, judges from the regional 
courts must deal with all that normativity and more. Indeed, applicants to 
these courts -through the translation done by lawyers and NGOs119 - rely 
on their affiliation to religion or to Roma and indigenous cultures in the 
light of the ECHR and the ACHR. Additionally, they also resort to laws 
outside the courts' jurisdiction, such as the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, recommendations by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, and the ILO Convention No. 169. 
It follows that, as in other social fields discussed in the first section, 
when it comes to international human rights systems, people not only have 
117. Maleiha Malik, Religion and Minority Legal Order, RELIGION, SECULARISM 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 358, 358-60 (Jean Cohen & C6cile Laborde eds., 
2016). 
118. See, e.g., Robert Home, Gypsies and Travellers in the United Kingdom: 
Planning, Housing and Human Rights in a ChangingLegal Regulatory Framework, 20 
STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 533, 534 (2009). 
119. Lawyers and NGOs are not just "intermediaries who translate global ideas 
into local situations" but also "retranslate local ideas into global frameworks." SALLY 
ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 134 (2006). 
100 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTs LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23 
recourse to more than one human rights body (forum shopping), 120 but also 
they use more than one law to assert their claims depending on context, 
strategies, and other factors. Once such claims reach the judicial body, a 
number of techniques play out in determining whether and how to recog-
nize and accommodate culturally-based rights claims. The variety of nor-
mative claims and sources that can be brought to the supranational fora 
injects dynamism into the system, which facilitates the transfer of legal pos-
tulates from one struggle to another, serving the interests of different cultur-
ally defined groups. At the same time, this dynamism incentivizes these 
human rights courts to endorse evolving interpretations that borrow or inte-
grate a variety of norms while accommodating cultural diversity - albeit not 
without difficulties. These processes are further discussed below. We start 
this discussion by exploring the navigation and appropriation of cultural 
claims that depart from state-backed norms on land use and ways of life. 
Here, we focus on cases concerning indigenous and Roma/Travelers rights 
claims. Next, we discuss other examples concerning state regulations on 
marriage and social security vis-a-vis the rights of women committed to 
their ethnic and religious affiliations. Subsequently, we explore the mecha-
nisms that have, or might have, assisted human rights courts in accommo-
dating non-dominant cultural diversity. Finally, we reflect upon some of the 
challenges involved in these processes of normative interaction and 
accommodation. 
A. Dealing with Non-State Norms on Land and Ways of Life: 
Indigenous and Roma/JravelersCases 
A case in point is to analyze indigenous land rights claims before both 
the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights. So long as such 
claims assert communal rights based on customary tenure, on the use of 
land or even on the spiritual connection with it and its resources, they de-
part from dominant notions of property and modes of living usually en-
dorsed by states to regulate land and natural resources matters. 
In the European context, more than two decades ago, the former Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights addressed indigenous claims over an-
cestral land and natural resources in relation to the construction of a 
hydroelectric dam on traditional Sami land in Norway.1 21 Although the 
Commission did not find for the applicants and reframed their property 
120. This is possible because, to use McCruden's words, supranational courts are 
"[s]haring [an] overlapping legal space." See Christopher McCrudden, The Pluralismof 
Human Rights Adjudication, REASONING RIGHTS. COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL ENGAGE-
MENT 3, 6 (Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden & Nigel Bowles eds., 2014). 
121. G. and E. v. Norway, App. No. 9278/81 & 9415/8 1, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1983). 
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claims as an issue of "private life, family life and home" under Article 8 
ECHR, it stated that minorities were, in principle, entitled to claim the right 
to respectfor a particularway of life they may lead as private life, family 
life, or home. 122 The normative recognition of a traditionalway of life (in-
clusive of a livelihood deemed culturally relevant) has been linked to the 
international protection afforded to the cultural life of minorities, not just in 
the European system, but also in the UN contextl 23 and the Inter-American 
system. 
It is well known that the IACtHR has been faced with numerous com-
plaints concerning indigenous and tribal customary rights to ancestral lands 
and natural resources, and that it has recognized their traditional communal 
rights. In doing so, the Court relied on the right to property in article 21 
ACHR, which has been reinterpreted as embracing collective forms of land 
ownership based on indigenous usage and customs. In the Court's view, 
"disregard for specific versions of use and enjoyment of property, springing 
from the culture, uses, customs, and beliefs of each people, would be tanta-
mount to holding that there is only one way of using and disposing of prop-
erty, which would render protection under article 21 of the Convention 
illusory for millions of persons."l 2 4 At the heart of this normative construct 
lies the protection of indigenous and tribal people's way of life and their 
cultural identity. According to the Court, the starting point of such a partic-
ular way of life is their close relation with their traditional lands and natural 
resources, "not only because they are their main means of survival, but also 
because they form part of [. . .] their cultural identity."1 2 5 Interestingly, the 
ACHR does not contain a right to cultural identity or integrity, as it is often 
recognized in the domestic laws of several American states. However, the 
122. Id. at 35. 
123. UNCHR Gen. Cmt. No. 23, art. 27, Rights of Minorities, [ 7, CCPRIC/21/ 
Rev.1 /Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994); see also MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 658-64 (2005). 
124. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merit, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 120 (Mar. 29, 2006) [hereinafter 
Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay]; Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits 
and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 1 161 (June 27, 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Sarayaku v. Ecuador]; and, Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandf and the Emberd 
Indigenous People of Bayano and their Members v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) ¶[ 111 (Oct. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Kuna and the Emberd v. Panama]. 
125. Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) [ 135 (June 17, 2005) [hereinafter Yakye Axa v. Paraguay]; 
Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) ¶118 (Mar. 29, 2006); Xdkmok Kdsek Indigenous Community v. Para-
guay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 261 (Aug. 
24, 2010) [hereinafter Xdkmok Kdsek v. Paraguay]. 
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Court has not only relied on the concept of cultural identity to sustain a 
novel interpretation of the right to property, but has furthermore recognized 
a right to cultural (and collective) identity of indigenous communities - and 
found that states violated this right.1 26 
While the case law on indigenous rights by the ECtHR remains rela-
tively scarce and provides limited insights on the accommodation of indige-
nous lifestyles and norms, 1 2 7 issues of accommodating a minority way of 
life have gained resonance in the Court's jurisprudence regarding Roma and 
Travelers. In a number of such cases, nomadic as well as sedentarized 
Roma and Travelers turned to the ECtHR to redress evictions or threats of 
eviction. Their eviction was usually due to the infringement of land-use 
regulations regarding stationing caravans on sites owned, rented or occu-
pied by Roma or Travelers. In response, they claimed that state authorities 
failed to accommodate their traditional practice of living in caravans. Ac-
cording to Acton, Caffrey, and Mundy, different normative systems are ap-
propriate for different lifestyles amongst the Roma. The "feud model," 
which generally relies on the nuclear family that constitutes an independent 
economic unit, belongs to a more nomadic lifestyle. In turn, the "tribunal 
model" fits a more settled and structured lifestyle.1 28 These norms and prac-
tices are nonetheless dynamic and adapted over time, especially as a result 
of technical and socio-economic changes prompted by neoliberal poli-
cies. 129 Of note, some of the factors identified as obstructing the accommo-
dation of Roma's lifestyles are a system of land ownership based on 
exclusive occupation that rules out traditional usages of the land, alongside 
planning regulations that control land use as a form of development.1 30 
In Buckley, the first Roma case decided by the ECtHR, the applicant 
claimed that regulations impeding the occupation of her caravan on her own 
land violated her right to respect for her home and her right to private and 
126. Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 245, 1 213, 217, 220 (June 27, 2012). 
127. Cases as decided by the Court on their merits. Timo Koivurova, Jurispru-
dence of the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights Regarding Indigenous Peoples: Retro-
spect and Prospects, 18 INT'L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 1, 8-10 (2011). 
128. Thomas Acton, Susan Caffrey & Gary Mundy, Theorizing Gypsy Law, 45 
AM. J. COMP. L. 237, 244, 248-249 (1997). 
129. On the detrimental impact that the international shift toward neoliberal poli-
cies has had on ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples' lives. See, e.g., Nando Sigona 
& Nidhi Trehan, Introduction:Romani Politics in NeoliberalEurope, ROMANI POLITICS 
IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: POVERTY, ETHNIC MOBILIZATION, AND THE NEOLIBERAL 
ORDER 1, 2-4 (Nando Signona & Nidhi Trehan eds., 2009). 
130. Pat Niner, Accommodating Nomadism? An Examination of Accommodation 
Optionsfor Gypsies and Travellers in England, 19 HOUSING STUD. 149, 152 (2004). 
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family life (Art. 8 ECHR).'1' She contended that this right protected her 
Gypsy way of life, which involved living in caravans and traveling.1 32 The 
former European Commission found for the applicant, supporting the appli-
cability of the concept of a traditional way of life to the Roma.13 3 At the 
time, this legal reasoning was not upheld by the ECtHR.1 34 It later did so, 
establishing the protection of family and private life of a particular cultural 
identity as one of the tenets of the ECtHR case law on Roma and Travelers. 
The Roma/Gypsy custom of living in caravans and traveling entered the 
scope of article 8 ECHR, reshaping the meaning of both "home" and "pri-
vate and family life." 
The cases discussed here also serve to illustrate that the porosity of 
both law and culture has made it possible for different actors to strategically 
use legal concepts through appropriation and integration of normative pos-
tulates that navigate across different settings. A good example is provided 
by the legal appeal of a right to protection of a way of life, which has 
prompted further navigation of the concept within the European human 
rights system. Aside from its application in the context of indigenous, Roma 
and Travelers' struggles, the right to a way of life has also been used to 
challenge state bans on fox and other animal hunting with dogs. This is an 
old traditional practice that persists despite UK laws prohibiting it and the 
strong opposition of animal rights defenders. 135 Indeed, in a case declared 
inadmissible by the ECtHR, individuals and a countryside association from 
the UK claimed human rights protection of a particular lifestyle encompass-
ing the cultural traditions of rural 'hunting communities' and their econ-
omy. 13 6 Regardless of the Court's reasons for declaring the petition 
manifestly ill-founded,137 the case reveals that a wide set of normative 
131. ECHR art. 8. 
132. Buckley v. United Kingdom, Judgment, App. No. 20348/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. ¶ 53 (1996). 
a133. "[The Commission] accepts, as submitted by the applicant, that living in 
home is an integral and deeply-felt part of her gypsy life-style." Id. at ¶ 64.caravan 
134. However, the argument did resonate for some judges of the Court who dis-
sented from the majority position. See dissenting opinions of Judge Pettiti, Judge 
Lohmus and Judge Repik. See id. 
135. For a general overview of the practice and its persistence despite the state 
ban. See Laurence Dodds, Ten Years on from the Fox HuntingBan, has Anything Really 
Changed?, THE TELEGRAPH, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/countryside/ 
11418998/Ten-years-on-from-the-hunting-ban-has-anything-really-changed.html (last 
visited, April 14, 2016). 
136. Friend v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. In 36-38 
(2009). 
137. The ECtHR basically confined its protection of way of life to that of ethnic or 
other 'discrete minority groups' and to activities that were not of a public nature barely 
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claims over tradition, practices, and livelihoods may be grounded in the 
protection of a particular way of life and cultural identity covered by the 
right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. This also suggests 
that courts will have an increasingly difficult task in justifying which ways 
of lives are accommodated or formally recognized - and those that are not. 
Likewise, in the Inter-American system, legal postulates on land rights 
tied to cultural identity resonate beyond indigenous peoples. Indeed, they 
have also been used in the context of afro-descendant rural people claiming 
collective rights over land and resources occupied by them, as demonstrated 
by the Saramaka and Operation Genesis cases.13 8 Both cases concerned 
afro-descendant communities that the Court considered socially and cultur-
ally distinguishable from the rest of the state population and, which had, 
according to the Court, a special link to the land. In the first case, extractive 
industry concessions over the community's land .were granted to private 
actors, while in the second case the resident afro-descendant population was 
displaced. In both cases, the IACtHR regarded them as 'tribal' peoples and 
granted rights accordingly.1 39 In taking this decision, the Court underlined 
the state obligation to protect an indigenous-like way of life and cultural 
identity. 
The extension of indigenous-like protection to afro-descendant rural 
people and the Court's definition of Article 21 ACHR as including non-
Western forms of property suggest that the aforementioned norms and inter-
pretations might be taken further and applied to other rights struggles, such 
as that of peasants, pastoralists, and other rural communities. 14 0 Such groups 
are also in a position to articulate similar legal claims as they have a strong 
linked to personal autonomy and identity. It also argued that the ban did not take up the 
applicants' employment nor did it stigmatize them in the eyes of society Id. at ¶¶ 43-45. 
138. Afro-descendant communities displaced from the Cacarica River Basin. Op-
eration Genesis v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Nov. 20, 2013); Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Nov. 28, 2007). 
139. Operation Genesis, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 270, ¶¶ 346-47; and, 
Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) Np. 172, 1 80. The Court's interpretation 
has been maintained subsequent cases concerning afro-descendant communities. See 
e.g. Community Garffuna Triunfo de la Cruz &its members v. Honduras, Merits, Repa-
rations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Oct. 8, 2015) and Garffuna 
Punta Piedra Community and its members v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
(Oct. 8, 2015). 
140. The former UN Special Rapporteur for the right to food, for instance, has 
addressed this question and called to extend the protection to at least certain traditional 
communities that entertain a similar relationship with their ancestral lands, centered on 
the community rather than on the individual. Oliver De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food) The Right to Food, ¶ 13, 26, U.N. Doc. A/65/281 (Aug. 11, 2010). 
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cultural connection to the land and its natural resources, and they too endure 
dispossession, discrimination, and insecurity in land tenure. Yet, at the 
same time, the cultural script of the legal protection developed around in-
digenous' identity and lifestyle cast doubts on its ability to grant protection 
to other rural people who may not fit the protected cultural identity. This 
potential exclusionary effect attests to the problem generated when courts 
essentialize culture and identity in order to protect them. This issue is dis-
cussed further in section III below. 
B. Dealing with Non-State Norms on Marriage and Religion: Cases 
Concerning Women's Rights 
Other relevant cases from the ECtHR are those regarding the granting 
of legal effects to non-official marriages performed according to the cultural 
affiliation of the applicants. In Mudloz Diaz v. Spain, a widow, who married 
under Roma rites, claimed recognition of her marriage and the ensuing sur-
vivor pension granted by the state following the death of the spouse. She 
was unsuccessful in her claims for equal recognition of her Roma marriage. 
The ECtHR found no obligation in that respect for the respondent state. 
However, the ECtHR also held that the state's refusal to recognize the ef-
fects of the Roma marriage for the purposes of the survivor's pension was 
disproportionate. Remarkably, it provided that "the force of the collective 
beliefs of a community that is well-defined culturally cannot be ignored."'41 
In addition to the applicant's belief in the validity of her marriage cele-
brated according to the rites and traditions of the Roma minority to which 
she belonged, the Court stressed that such rites and traditions were not dis-
puted or regarded as being contrary to public order by the state. Key to the 
Court's reasoning was also Spain's prior acknowledgement of a widow's 
entitlement to a survivor's pension in cases where the marriage was not 
valid but there was a good faith belief in the existence of a marriage. Fur-
thermore, the Court relied on Spain's several official acts of recognition of 
the marital status of the applicant. These state-sanctioned forms of recogni-
tion appeared very relevant for the ECtHR to accept the claim that the union 
celebrated under Roma norms should at least generate a legal entitlement to 
survivor pension.1 4 2 
141. Mutioz Dfaz v. Spain, App. No. 49151/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 59 (2009). 
142. There are other cases in which it is possible to appreciate the Court's defer-
ence regarding state acts of recognition of legal plurality. For instance, in Kdroly Nagy 
v. Hungary (which concerned a compensation claim against the Hungarian Calvinist 
Church following the dismissal of a pastor of the Godoll"o parish) the ECtHR noted 
that "excluding claims based on ecclesiastical law from the jurisdiction of State courts 
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Not very long after, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled on a very 
similar complaint in erife Yifit v. Turkey. The facts in this case were for 
the most part analogous to those in Mufioz D(az, with the important differ-
ence that the applicant had married according to Islamic rites. At first 
glance, the case of Mrs. Yigit might appear as not being so much about the 
accommodation of non-dominant cultural claims, as it was the case of Mrs. 
Mufioz in the Spanish context. This is on account of the fact that Islam is 
the religion of the large majority of Turkey's population. Yet, the erife 
Yigit case is still relevant for the analysis undertaken here. Besides tensions 
and power struggles between secularists and religious groups in Turkey, it 
should be recalled that Muslims are certainly a non-dominant minority in 
the context of Europe. As such, the Court's view on Islam-related rights 
claims, even in the context of Turkey, are significant for whether and how 
the ECtHR and other countries will accommodate Muslims' needs and con-
cerns. Moreover, the specific situation of Mrs. Yigit was one of considera-
ble vulnerability, and her complaint in any case concerned the tension 
between her cultural and normative commitments and those of the state. 
Observing that Turkey, unlike Spain, had not given any official recog-
nition to any form of non-civil law marriage, the Court found that Mrs. 
Yigit, had no legitimate expectation of obtaining a survivor's pension and 
social security benefits on the basis of her "partner's" entitlement. Further-
more, the ECtHR attached considerable weight to the specific socio-cultural 
context invoked by the state, particularly with regard to Islam. In fact, in 
addition to the importance Turkey accorded to the principle of secularism, 
the Court noted that this state "aimed to put an end to a marriage tradition 
which places women at a clear disadvantage, not to say in a situation of 
dependence and inferiority, compared to men." 43 The Court assessed the 
state's refusal to recognize religious marriages in light of the prohibition of 
polygamy and the respect for gender equality. In other words, the refusal to 
recognize the applicant's religious marriage for the purposes of a survivor 
pension ultimately rested on the state's and the Court's views of the merits 
and value of Islam. Interestingly, the Court's appraisal of Islam does not 
appear to incorporate the viewpoint of religious women such as Mrs. Yigit, 
but rather seems to uphold a stereotypical idea of what Islam entails for 
Muslim women. Thus, paradoxically, it remains unclear whether the 
ECtHR considered the impact of the legal position it adopted upon Mrs. 
Yigit in particular and Muslim women in general. Lacking access to social 
security rights, after having taken care of the home, the deceased spouse 
does not violate Article 6 § 1of the Convention [right to access to court]." Kiroly Nagy 
v. Hungary, App. No. 56665/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 73 (2015). 
143. Serife Yigit v. Turkey [GC], App. No. 3976/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 81 (2010). 
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and six children, Muslim women like Mrs. Yigit, were actually the most 
burdened by the legal solution.144 
Finally, it is noteworthy that in Muffoz Diaz as well as some other 
cases regarding land-use permission for Roma and Travelers' caravans, the 
ECtHR conceded that: 
while the fact of belonging to a minority does not create an exemp-
tion from complying with marriage laws [or planning laws in the case 
of caravans], it may have an effect on the manner in which those laws 
are applied. [... .] the vulnerable position of Roma [and here we could 
also think of other social groups] means that some special considera-
tion should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in 
the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in partic-
14 5
ular cases. 
But how do human rights courts assess the extent to which states have 
taken steps to incorporate and give consideration to those views and needs? 
In cases like the ones discussed above, one may ask the extent to which 
courts could examine whether other measures less rights-restrictive could 
have been adopted or explored, such as equalizing the legal effects of long-
lasting cohabitation or encouraging civil registration of different forms of 
marriage. For instance, in cases dealing with the eviction of Roma and 
Travelers, inquires could determine whether enabling common sites, pro-
viding alternative pitches for parking caravans, or even regularizing infor-
mal Roma settlements were considered. In both kinds of cases, questions of 
governmental dialogue or engagement with the communities at stake might 
also be a matter for judicial consideration. 
C. Mechanisms to Recognize and Accommodate Non-Dominant Norms 
and CulturalPractices 
The cases examined thus far underscore the extent and the way in 
which non-dominant cultural claims have penetrated the judicial interpreta-
tion of human rights courts. They gave rise, for instance, to a collective 
right to land and natural resources, as well as a right to cultural identity and 
144. For a critical view on the approach taken by the Court in this respect, see the 
comment by Saila Ouald Chaib at the Strasbourg Observers Blog. Saila Ouald Chaib, 
Serife Yigit v. Turkey: The Court did it Again!, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Nov. 10, 
2010), http://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/11/10/serife-yigit-v-turkey-the-court-did-it-
again. 
145. See Mutioz Dfaz, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (2009); Connors v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 66746/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶84 (2004); Chapman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
27238/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶96 (2001); Winterstein and Others v. France, App. No. 27013/ 
07 Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 76 (2013). 
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to a traditional lifestyle. If we were to stick to the idea that human rights 
law is what the drafters originally wrote or what a group of sovereign states 
originally agreed upon, it would be difficult to explain those normative de-
velopments. The idea of interacting and evolving laws, as offered by a legal 
pluralist approach, is much more useful to understand the dynamism of the 
rights enshrined in human rights treaties, which take divergent and particu-
lar meaning in certain contexts. In some of the above examples, the Euro-
pean and Inter-American courts aimed at giving their respective 
conventions effective force in contemporary circumstances of cultural and 
normative plurality. In several of the cases revised both Courts relied, al-
though perhaps to different degrees, on a variety of normative sources: in-
ternational, regional, national, and even non-state law. In this regard, it is 
important to consider that litigants (in their quality of "translators") play a 
key role in integrating a vast set of norms into the adjudicating setting. 
Regarding the IACtHR's evolutionary interpretation of the ACHR, the 
integration of international norms outside the Inter-American context has 
played out significantly. The IACtHR has relied on the International Labour 
Organization's Convention No. 169 concerning indigenous and tribal peo-
ples in independent countries and other general and specific instruments, 
some of which were considered even if the state in question had not ratified 
them. The Court has also referred to domestic laws and, more importantly, 
to indigenous laws and customs. Throughout the process, the Court is 
guided by an interpretation pro-personae, according to which the Conven-
tion provisions should be read in the way that is most protective of human 
rights. 146 
Similarly, the ECtHR also appears influenced by other international 
sources, although most of them are state-generated. The ECtHR considers, 
for instance, the European Framework Convention for the Protection of Na-
tional Minorities, the European Social Charter, Resolutions and Recom-
mendations of the Committee of Ministers, and the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe. It has also considered decisions from the Euro-
pean Committee of Social Rights, and General Comments of the UN Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On several occasions, the 
Court has also referred to the ECHR as "a living instrument." Albeit the 
Court often uses the living instrument doctrine to highlight common norma-
tive developments within the Council of Europe (which evokes a sense of 
legal homogeneity rather than plurality), the appeal of the living instrument 
doctrine to a broader set of norms has been employed to justify a departure 
146. See, e.g., Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, 11125-30 (June 17, 2005). 
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from the cultural and normative setting prevailing in the responded state.1 47 
It follows that the living instrument device may be of particular relevance to 
uphold or accommodate cultural and normative claims that do not enjoy 
state recognition. Moreover, the living instrument approach is also impor-
tant to consider in the context of human rights implementation, as cultural 
norms are dynamic and therefore the implementation measures based upon 
them need to be revisited to ensure that they remain relevant and up-to-date. 
One may therefore argue that an "integrated perspective to human 
rights" 148 facilitated the cultural re-signification of legal concepts (e.g., 
property, home, family life) and the accommodation of non-dominant 
group's norms and commitments. Although the idea of integration in human 
rights law is usually seen as standing in opposition to legal pluralism, 149 the 
jurisprudence examined here suggests that bringing in a broad range of rele-
vant norms may assist courts and litigants in accounting for particular nor-
mative and cultural demands. In this sense, integrating human rights norms 
in an interpretive process does not necessarily produce, harmonized, or uni-
form normative outcomes. 150 Equally in the case of implementation, differ-
ent normative orders may be integrated to deliver a unique measure that 
protects the right in question in that context. Recalling that cultural systems 
are in perpetual evolution, the fact that normative systems influence and 
shape one another is not problematic. On some occasions, one system or 
the other may be effective, however, novel measures (like the NariAdalat) 
could be created by integrating normative systems. 
Furthermore, the case law examined also shed light on the importance 
of participatory mechanisms. An outstanding approach in this respect is that 
adopted by the IACtHR in indigenous land rights cases, where it has con-
sidered that engagement with the affected communities themselves allows 
each relevant actor to define and advance their interests and needs. This is 
reflected in the state duty to ensure informed prior consultation on matters 
affecting indigenous communities and even their free prior informed con-
147. George Letsas, The ECHR as a living instrument: its meaning and legiti-
macy, in CONSTITUTING EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NA-
TIONAL, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT 112 (Andreas Follesdal et al. eds., 2013) 
(referring to the third pattern disclosed by the Court's early case law which portrayed 
the convention as a living instrument. The author regards the use of present-day devel-
opments in the Council of Europe as a counterweight to the moral climate prevailing on 
the respondent state as "the central feature of evolutive interpretation as applied by the 
old Court.") 
148. Eva Brems, Should Pluriform Human Rights become one? Exploring the 
benefits of Human Rights Integration,4 EUROPEAN J. Hum. RTs. 447, 451-456 (2014). 
149. Oomen, supra note 6, at 484. 
150. Brems, supra note 148, at 469. 
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sent in certain circumstances.' 5' This is a valuable tool for bridging the legal 
and cultural worlds of the parties at stake. By requiring states to undertake a 
process of dialogue, the IACtHR fosters an encounter between the abstract/ 
universal human rights, the state normative order, and the particular needs, 
values, and norms of indigenous and tribal people. Participation can also 
mitigate the objectivizing force of the legal process over cultural identity 
claims, as those belonging to the cultural group in question will be able to 
define and contest what is regarded as their culture. 
By encouraging states to use participatory methods, human rights 
courts may contribute to a more dialogical construction of rights, which is 
something that should not be confined only to indigenous or tribal people's 
cases. Dialogical mechanisms may be helpful in a number of different situa-
tions, such as in cases of informal settlements and forced eviction, which 
underlie the plight of many Roma and Travelers,1 52 or in cases concerning 
religious claims. It follows then that the ECtHR could also benefit from 
promoting the use of participatory mechanisms. In doing so, the Court 
might endorse a sort of indigenous-like consultation requirement, or intro-
duce this as a procedural safeguard or as an element in its proportionality 
analysis. The ECtHR could, for instance, take into account the extent to 
which state authorities and the affected communities have endeavored to 
find solutions through dialogue, or it may weigh up evidence provided by 
empirical studies based on the views of those concerned.1 53 
This also applies to human rights implementation, and some rights spe-
cifically require a state to involve the public through consultation and par-
ticipation when implementing rights, such as the right to health.1 54 Public 
participation is an important way to achieve community buy-in or endorse-
ment, and promote the effectiveness of an implementation measure. This is 
particularly important given that in many states (especially post-colonial 
states), the state itself may not be the locus of authority and the participa-
tion of certain actors who do hold such authority (like the Council of 
Ulemas in Indonesia) is crucial. The UN treaty bodies have recognized the 
151. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 134-37 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
152. On the use of consultation like mechanisms, see, e.g., Comm. On Econ., Soc. 
& Cultural Rights, International Movement ATD Fourth World Against France, ¶ 78, 
No. 33/2006 (Dec. 5, 2007); UN Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Forced 
Evictions, and the Right to Adequate Housing, 1 14, 16 UN Doc. E/i 998/22 (May 20, 
1997); see also Liebenberg, supra note 106, at 26. 
153. For this it would be of course necessary that litigants incorporate this kind of 
material into the judicial setting. 
154. Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Culture Rights, The Right to the Highest Attaina-
ble Standard of Health ¶¶ 11, 17 Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
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importance of public dialogue and participation, and often calls states to 
engage thoroughly with civil society, community and religious leaders 
when implementing human rights. 
Finally, Serife, Yigit, Mufloz, Diaz, and some of the cases discussed 
above also provide the scope to consider the benefits of two normative tools 
devised within the framework of equality and non-discrimination: intersec-
tionality and the prohibition of indirect discrimination. Both of these tools 
may facilitate a better handling of legal hybridity. In the first place, the 
notion of intersectionality acknowledges a reality where individuals are 
crossed by many identities, feel bound to several communities, and suffer 
simultaneously different forms of oppression.1 5 5 For example, those who 
petitioned the Nari Adalats for redress would typically suffer multiple 
forms of oppression based on being women, poor, and uneducated. The 
intersectional approach focuses on the unique types of violations occurring 
at the intersections of various systems of subordination. 1 5 6 These may cer-
tainly include cultural and normative structures. Furthermore, by recogniz-
ing a person's multiple identities and community affiliations, the need to 
take heed of the various normative and cultural orders involved becomes 
more evident. 
The notion of indirect discrimination also helps to address questions of 
legal plurality and cultural diversity. The prohibition of indirect discrimina-
tion casts as impermissible laws or regulations that, despite being neutral in 
their formulation and general in their application, are, in practice, liable to 
have a particularly disadvantageous impact on certain groups.157 As ad-
dressed in this paper, this includes (internally diverse) groups such as wo-
men, Muslims, and Roma and Travelers. Hence, as observed by Ast, this 
legal tool may call for the introduction of exceptions or flexible legal re-
gimes to cope with diverse social realities.15 8 It may also alert us to care-
155. In this vein, Bond who explains how intersectionality enriched the under-
standing of women's experiences who, at the time of the drafting of CEDAW, were not 
viewed as members of cultural communities. Johanna E. Bond, Women's Rights, Cus-
tomary Law and the Promise of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, THE 
FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 467, 474 (Jeanmarie Fenrich et al. eds., 2011). 
156. Johanna E. Bond, InternationalIntersectionality:A Theoretical and Prag-
matic Exploration of Women's InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 
71, 157-158 (2003). 
157. INTER-RIGHTS, NON-DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. A HANDBOOK 
FOR PRACTITIONERS 70 (2011); OLIVIER DE SCHUTrER, THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMI-
NATION UNDER EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: RELEVANCE FOR THE EU NON-Dis-
CRIMINATION DIRECTIVES - AN UPDATE 23 (2011). 
158. Fr6d6rique Ast, EuropeanLegal FrameworkResponding to Diversity andthe 
Need for InstitutionalChange. Indirect Discriminationas a Means of Protecting Plu-
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fully scrutinize the invocation of contextual factors -such as prevailing 
ideologies or social customs- to justify the refusal to accommodate other 
cultural claims and norms. These concerns regarding intersectionality and 
indirect discrimination are relevant in the adjudication of human rights and 
the implementation processes discussed above. For example, while women 
may theoretically have the same access to state courts for dispute resolution 
as men, in practice, they are not able to access the courts and receive 
favorable outcomes to the same extent as men. 
Without downplaying the complexities of accommodating non-domi-
nant religious or other culturally motivated practices in a given society, the 
cases reviewed here raise the issue of how to deal with the social reality of 
religious and cultural communities who abide by their customs and norms 
in plural legal situations. They also present the question of how courts and 
other supervisory bodies may do so without taking the role of defining and 
fixing the meaning and value of a given culture or identity, or without fore-
closing opportunities of empowerment for the people concerned. We turn to 
some of these challenges in the next section. 
III. SOME CHALLENGES IN ACCOUNTING FOR NORMATIVE 
PLURALITY AND NON-STATE CULTURAL CLAIMS 
The analysis conducted in the previous sections inevitably leads us to 
assess normative discourses over tradition, culture, and way of life, which 
entail political, social, and legal implications. In this part of the paper we 
sketch a few of them, namely, cultural essentialism, group boundaries, and 
the limitation of opportunities for further empowerment. These issues all 
arise in the process of human rights implementation and adjudication in-
volving plural normative orders. 
Initially, the ECtHR in a number of cases reduced the protection of a 
"Gypsy way of life" mainly to the occupation of caravans and nomadism. 
While the Court acknowledged that many Roma no longer live a nomadic 
life, 159 it noted that applicants appeared not to be pursuing an itinerant lifes-
tyle, which meant that the case was not about "the traditional itinerant 
Gypsy lifestyle." 60 Even if this constitutes a fair legal simplification of 
ralism: Challenges and Limits, in INSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION AND THE CITIZEN: 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL INTERACTION IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY 85, 86-88 (2009). 
159. See, e.g., Chapman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27238/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 
73 (2001); Beard v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24882/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 84 (2001); 
Coster v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24876/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 87 (2001). 
160. Chapman, App. No. 27238/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 105; Beard, App. No. 24882/ 
94, Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 116; Coster, App. No. 24876/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 119; Lee v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 25289/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 107 (2001); . 
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Roma and Travelers' culture, the characterization has its risks. As observed 
by Poulter in the British context, the definition of Roma along nomadic 
lines is mostly a legal creation of policy-makers and judges.1 61 Moreover, 
"by defining Travelers by what they do (or by folkloric expectations of their 
behavior) the state has retained the power to control their use of the land, 
differentiate their authentication and respond to the prejudices of the major-
ity population."l 62 Nomadism, in fact, does not adequately reflect the lived 
experience of many Roma and Travelers, nor is its protection instrumental 
to achieve (better) justice. Protecting a Gypsy lifestyle to the extent that it is 
nomadic excludes many sedentarized Roma who continue to regard the use 
of mobile homes as a central part of their experience. Further, recognition 
on the basis of nomadism exposes Roma and Travelers to greater socio-
economic disadvantage as itinerancy confines them to a life that is no 
longer economically viable.1 63 Fortunately, however, the ECtHR has moved 
away from the emphasis on nomadism,1 64 which nonetheless remains an 
important criterion in state regulations. 
An additional problem may arise in terms of who is entitled to protec-
tion. In fact, conferring rights to the extent that a certain cultural script is 
met implies that many may not be able to live up to the cultural or norma-
tive tradition legally recognized. This difficulty, linked to the question of 
essentialism, materializes in fixed group or cultural boundaries. Thus, for 
example, in deciding the inadmissibility of an application submitted by a 
"[n]ew [t]raveler," the ECtHR recalled that these people, unlike Gypsies by 
birth, live a nomadic lifestyle through personal choice and not on account of 
being born into any ethnic or cultural group. Accordingly, it was doubtful 
whether new Travelers who choose that lifestyle would be entitled to the 
protection afforded to true Gypsies or Travelers.1 65 A preference for inner 
traits, like in this case, is relevant to the question of how the law -in this 
case human rights law- deals with diversity. Such a preference actually en-
161. See SEBASTIAN POULTER, ETHNICITY, LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EN-
GLISH EXPERIENCE 541 (1998); Robert Home, supra note 118, at 538 (2009). 
162. POULTER, supra note 161, at 541. 
163. THE TRAVELLER MOVEMENT, A PLACE TO CALL HOME: ETHNICITY, CULTURE 
AND PLANNING FOR TRAVELLER SITES 3-4, 8 (2014). 
164. Connors v. United Kingdom, App. No. 66746/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 93 (2004). 
For a more recent example of how the Court affords protection to settled Travelers 
living in mobile homes, see Winterstein v. France, App. No. 27013/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2013). 
165. Horie v. United Kingdom, App. No. 31845/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶[¶ 28-29 
(2011). On this case see Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer. Lourdes Peroni & 
Alexandra Timmer, Gypsy Way of Life "By Birth" or "By Choice," STRASBOURG On-
SERVERS (Feb. 22, 2011), http://strasbourgobservers.com/category/cases/horie-v-uk. 
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tails an assimilationist bias. As explained by Yoshino, when courts protect 
traits that cannot be changed (e.g., skin color or ethnic ascendancy), but do 
not do so for characteristics that individuals are able to modify (e.g., dress, 
the way of life, or the religion one practices), then an individual's only 
alternative is conformity to the dominant norms. 166 Supervisory bodies thus 
need to be aware of the cultural character of any form of social categoriza-
tion and of its effects, including those they make in the course of adjudicat-
ing and implementing human rights norms. 
The IACtHR, in turn, also discloses a rather essentialist cultural view 
in a number of judgments in which it characterizes the ties between indige-
nous/tribal peoples and their ancestral territories. The Court has consistently 
referred to traditional uses and customs. The examples given by the Court 
include ceremonial activities, languages, arts and rituals, practices in con-
nection with nature, customary law, dress, seasonal or nomadic hunting, 
fishing or gathering, and use of natural resources associated with their cus-
toms or other elements characteristic of their culture.1 67 Like in the cases 
discussed above, this also brings risks of essentialism and group bounda-
ries. This discourse may force indigenous populations to present themselves 
according to a frozen cultural lifestyle in order to secure protection for their 
rights, while also reducing the possibilities that peasants and other rural 
communities, who may legitimately articulate similar demands to collective 
lands, could benefit from a rights framework whose cultural imprint they 
may not meet. Additionally, as noted by some scholars, this portrait of in-
digenous identity/culture may also entail economic and political drawbacks, 
such as foreclosing opportunities for the communities who may wish to 
benefit from non-traditional practices or techniques for managing or ex-
ploiting their natural resources.1 6 8 The IACtHR has even suggested that cer-
tain special safeguards to regulate the restriction of indigenous peoples' 
collective property would only be applicable to those resources traditionally 
used by the community and which are vital to their survival and way of 
life. 169 These cases, therefore, provide some insight to the dangers of lock-
166. Kenji Yoshino, Pressureto Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at 4. 
167. Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) 1 148 ( June 27, 2012); Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 154 (June 17, 2005). 
168. Ariel E Dulitzky, When Afro-Descendants Became "Tribal Peoples": The 
Inter-American Human Rights System and Rural Black Communities I UCLA J. INT'L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 29, 47-48 (2010); Thomas M. Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and 
Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Court, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 113, 
161 (2013). 
169. Such safeguards are (1) the community's effective participation; (2) indepen-
dent environmental and social impact assessment; and (3) reasonable benefit sharing. 
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ing indigenous people and members of other ethnic communities into their 
traditional cultures and norms- and ignoring the inherent dynamism of all 
cultures and normative systems. 
Equally in the case where non-state norms are used to implement 
human rights, members of cultural communities should not be locked into 
this identity and normative system. In order to ensure human rights protec-
tion and access to effective remedies, it is crucial that state functions and 
interventions are not dispensed with altogether. It is important that, for ex-
ample, women can continue to be able to forum shop and to select the sys-
tem (formal or informal) and the norms (state or non-state) - or a 
combination thereof - that best support their rights. Women in cultural com-
munities need to be able to 'opt-out' of their customary system if necessary 
or desirable.o70 As such, the state cannot leave matters entirely to the system 
of local norms, but needs to provide safeguards, supervision, and remedies 
where women's rights are not protected - as is their responsibility under 
international law. Yet, it is recommended that when states provide for these 
responsibilities, they recognize the crucial role of other norms and to en-
gage with them. 
Of course, the law works through categorizations and therefore it is 
very difficult to devoid the adjudication and implementation processes from 
their essentializing force. Yet it is important to note that the aforementioned 
risks arise despite the cultural essentialism being premised on a certain pos-
itive or valued account of the identities at stake, as that appears to be the 
Courts' view of Roma and indigenous cultures. There are, however, other 
instances where the judicial essentialization of a given culture or identity 
conveys harm in itself, as it occurs where courts rest on a negative stereo-
type of a given culture or identity. This is well illustrated by the ECtHR's 
depiction of Islam in the case of erife Yigit v. Turkey. It is equally illus-
trated in the example of customary law adapting to provide for women's 
inheritance, where the state and UN treaty bodies had deemed the system 
incompatible with women's rights standards. As noted in the first section, 
the treaty bodies at times have essentialized culture, interpreting it as static 
and uniform when in fact it is changing and varied. To avoid issues of 
essentialism and exclusion, those within the cultural communities are best 
placed to articulate their norms, and such a process of articulation should be 
inclusive of all community members. This is also vital given that all cultural 
See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Cost, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 155 (Nov. 28, 2007). For a critique on this, see Antkowiak, supra 
note 166, at 167. 
170. Yvonne Donders, Do cultural diversity and human rights make a good 
match?, 61 INT'L Soc. Sci. J. 15, 18 (2010); see also Sezgin, supra note 50, at 29. 
116 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23 
systems are constantly evolving. As a consequence, states as well as super-
visory bodies should be careful to refrain from essentializing culture, or 
making outside determinations of such norms for the purposes of human 
rights implementation and adjudication. 
Finally, some of the examples discussed above regarding human rights 
implementation via non-state, normative systems also raise problematic is-
sues of empowerment. As noted, the Nari Adalat have been criticized for 
not challenging the patriarchy enough and, even once reformed, traditional 
Adat law in Bali still did not provide for women's equal inheritance with 
men. As this demonstrates, there can be a limit on the agency of community 
members to reform their own systems to better protect human rights, and 
sometimes a persistent reluctance of systems to such change. As such, there 
is still a role for the state in meeting the challenges of navigating plural 
legal systems regarding human rights. These problems also demonstrate 
that no one system will necessarily provide all the solutions, and that legally 
plural situations are complex, multifaceted, and sensitive. Therefore, while 
the assertion of cultural commitments through human rights law have found 
their way before supranational human rights bodies, the increasing leverage 
of cultural claims has brought about important challenges that require these 
bodies to be careful in their methods and reasoning for accommodating cul-
tural diversity. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As demonstrated in this paper, legal pluralism can assist in understand-
ing the link and interaction between human rights and culture as normative 
orders with overlapping subject matters. In both human rights implementa-
tion and adjudication, the legal pluralist perspective reveals the competition 
and contestation between local, national, and also international norms. This 
dynamic is apparent through the process of international human rights su-
pervision via the UN treaty bodies and the regional courts in Europe and 
Latin America. This paper explored how a legal pluralist perspective can 
reveal opportunities and challenges for the effective implementation and 
adjudication of cultural rights claims raised by non-dominant groups. 
The first section examined how different normative orders may assist 
to more effectively implement human rights standards. It contended that 
mobilizing non-state dispute resolution mechanisms and non-state law 
could work to help protect women's rights regarding domestic violence and 
property. To be most effective, implementation measures need to be tailor 
made to each situation, catering for the particular issues and actors in-
volved. Given the role of culture in human rights, effective implementation 
measures in one setting may be ineffective in another given the variety of 
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competing normative systems. This fact favors local over national imple-
mentation measures where possible, reflecting the fact that human rights are 
not one size fits all. This underscores the need for a diversity of human 
rights implementation measures, both within and between states. Human 
rights law creates space for and also welcomes such diversity. The human 
rights treaty bodies accept a variety of implementation measures and human 
rights courts increasingly engage in responding to claims that attempt to 
make human rights standards reflective of cultural diversity. This applies to 
the cultural and normative particularism raised by states parties, but also to 
cultural claims advanced by non-dominant actors. Despite this, we argued 
that in their supervision of state compliance with human rights standards, 
the UN treaty bodies fail to consistently engage meaningfully with non-
state normative systems. As such, the treaty bodies are called upon to more 
thoroughly and consistently consider implementation beyond the possibili-
ties offered by state law and institutions. As already cautioned, this does not 
mean dispending with state functions. Rather, the suggestion advanced is 
that while in principle the role of "all organs of society" in protecting and 
promoting human rights has been recognized internationally, treaty bodies 
are yet to fully engage with it and states to fully operationalize it. 
The second section argued that the legal pluralist lenses are useful to 
understand questions of normative space and cultural diversity beyond state 
claims of deference before supranational human rights courts. Exploring 
several illustrative cases concerning people with indigenous, ethnic, and re-
ligious affiliation before regional courts demonstrated how cultural rights 
claims that evoke non-dominant normative commitments have gained cur-
rency and been used strategically by different actors. The ECtHR and 
IACtHR have incorporated or accommodated some of these claims. In that 
context, certain mechanisms appear particularly well placed to deal with the 
normative hybridity at stake. This is the case for interpretative techniques 
that regard human rights treaties as living instruments or that resort to a 
wide set of relevant norms, including transnational rules and norms with a 
local and customary character. Here again, as with implementation, a con-
versation is apparent between international, national, and non-state law as 
mediated by the regional court. Additionally, for both the adjudication and 
implementation of human rights, participatory mechanisms that allow a 
more dialogical and context-sensitive construction of rights have also 
proven valuable to address normative and cultural diversity. Due to this, it 
has been argued that dialogical devices could be further promoted and uti-
lized by human rights bodies. A similar claim has been advanced regarding 
the application of an intersectional approach and the prohibition of indirect 
discrimination. 
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As argued in this paper, there are numerous mechanisms in interna-
tional law to engage with and incorporate non-state law and plural legal 
systems. These are important in order to better protect the rights of those 
who belong to cultural minorities and non-dominant groups. These mecha-
nisms may serve to counteract some of the critical challenges offered by the 
normative discourses on culture and tradition adopted by supervisory bodies 
for the purposes of implementing and adjudicating human rights in cultur-
ally-sensitive matters. The challenges include the risk of essentializing cul-
ture or making outside determinations of its norms; drawing exclusionary 
boundaries among groups or cultures; and overlooking issues of socio-eco-
nomic disempowerment. While avoiding these pitfalls is not a straightfor-
ward task, an important first step is to interrogate the operation of 
international human rights law in light of cultural norms that co-exist with 
state-sanctioned laws and traditions. Despite international law's tendency to 
focus on the state as its subject, recognition of other actors and norms is 
increasing and expanding the dialogue on what human rights are in practice. 
